Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship

Spring 2012

The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion:
The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility
for Health Risks and Costs
Wendy K. Mariner
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and
Costs, 50 Duquesne Law Review 271 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/363

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

THE AFF
FORDABL
LE CARE ACT AND
D HEALTH
H PROMO
OTION:
THE ROLE
E OF INSU
URANCE IN
N DEFINING RESP
PONSIBILIITY FOR
HEALTH
E
RISKS AND
D COSTS
50 Duq
quesne Law Review 2711 (Spring 2012)
Boston
B
University Schoo
ol of Law Pu
ublic Law & Legal Reseaarch Paper N
No. 13-10
(Aprril 16, 2013))

Wendy
y K. Mariner
ool of Law
Bos
ston Unive
ersity Scho
w

This paperr can be do
ownloaded w
without cha
arge at:
ww.bu.edu/law/faculty//scholarship
p/workingpa
apers/2013
3.html
http://ww

File: 271 Mariner Article REVISED_R2.doc

Created on: 4/11/2012 11:17:00 AM

Last Printed: 4/11/2012 11:38:00 AM

The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion:
The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for
Health Risks and Costs
Wendy K. Mariner*
I.
II.
III.
IV.

V.
VI.
VII.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 271
INSURANCE REFLECTS AND SHAPES
CONCEPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK ............... 276
ACA INSURANCE PROVISIONS TO PROMOTE HEALTH .. 282
CHRONIC DISEASE: PREVENTION, COSTS,
AND WELLNESS PROGRAMS .......................................... 290
A. Chronic Disease: Prevalence and Causes ........... 290
B. Employee Wellness Programs.............................. 298
C. Evidence for Health Improvement....................... 304
D. Evidence for Cost Savings ................................... 309
IMPLICATIONS OF USING INSURANCE TO
PROMOTE HEALTH ....................................................... 310
PREVENTION OUTSIDE INSURANCE .............................. 326
CONCLUSION ................................................................ 330

I. INTRODUCTION
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA” or “Act”),1 saying that it stood for “the core principle that everybody should have some basic security when it
comes to their health care.”2 The ACA’s most visible goal is to expand access to health benefit coverage to a majority of the unin-

* Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public
Health, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical
Sciences, Boston University School of Medicine.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42
U.S.C.).
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with
a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.
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3
sured. Nonetheless, underlying this goal is an equally important
objective: “bending the cost curve” or reducing the rate of increase
in health care costs, which total about $2.6 trillion or almost
eighteen percent of GDP.4 The President and many economists
saw controlling health care costs as an important step toward economic recovery.5 Although the Act does not directly regulate the
costs of care, many of its provisions are intended to develop new
ways to slow both public and private spending for health care, especially for chronic diseases,6 which are reported to account for the

3. See P AUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: T HE P ECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE
H EALTH R EFORM 239-41 (2011); Theodore Marmor et al., The Obama Administration’s Options for Health Care Cost Control: Hope Versus Reality, 150 ANNALS INTERN.
MED. 485, 485 (2009); COMM. ON HEALTH INSURANCE STATUS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES,
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, AMERICA’ S U NINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR H EALTH
AND H EALTH C ARE 49 (2009) (“[H]ealth insurance coverage is integral to health care access
and health.”).
4. David M. Cutler et al., Why Health Reform Will Bend the Cost Curve,
COMMONWEALTH FUND, Dec. 7, 2009, 6, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2009/Dec/Why-Health-Reform-Will-Bend-the-Cost
-Curve.aspx; Anne B. Martin et al., Growth in US Health Spending Remained Slow in
2010; Health Share of Gross Domestic Product Was Unchanged from 2009, 31 H EALTH
AFFS. 208, 208-09 & exhibit 1 (2012). The Act includes a finding by the Senate that “this
Act will reduce the Federal deficit between 2010 and 2019.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1563.
5. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the
Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-state-union-address). See David M. Mirvis & David E.
Bloom, Population Health and Economic Development in the United States, 300 JAMA 93,
95 (2008) (finding that improved population health is associated with increased economic
growth); Sheila D. Smith et al., Income, Insurance, and Technology: Why Does Health
Spending Outpace Economic Growth?, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 1276 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1003 (authorizing Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services to review insurance premiums for “unreasonable increases” and to provide grants to states to conduct reviews or rate setting); id.
§ 1103 (limiting Medicare Advantage plans’ medical loss ratios to 85% of premiums); id. §§
1311-1331 (creation of health insurance exchanges to offer competitively priced health
insurance plans); id. § 1421 (small business tax credit for employee health insurance); id. §
1561 (standards for electronic enrollment in government programs); id. § 2551 (reductions
in federal Medicaid funding for disproportionate share hospitals); id. § 2601 (grants for
demonstrations projects to coordinate care for persons eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid (“dual eligibles”)); id. § 2602 (improve coordination of benefits for dual eligibles); id. §
2701 (authorizing Medicaid waivers to create medical homes to provide cost-effective, coordinated care); id. § 2702 (prohibiting Medicaid payments for inappropriate diagnoses); id.
§§ 2704-2706 (authorizing grants for demonstration projects with Medicaid providers to
test bundled payments, global payment systems, and pediatric accountable care organizations); id. § 2801 (amending the Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program
payment and access provisions); id. § 3001 (authorizing value-based purchasing of services
for Medicare beneficiaries from hospitals that meet performance standards); id. § 3004
(providing that long-term care hospitals that fail to submit reports forfeit Medicare rate
increases); id. § 3006 (authorizing development of value-based payments by Medicare to
skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, and ambulatory surgical centers); id. §
3007 (authorizing adjustments to Medicare payments to physicians based on cost and qualOVER
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majority of health care costs, as well as almost two-thirds of annual deaths in the United States.8
Conventional wisdom argues that most chronic diseases are
caused by behavioral factors, such as lack of physical activity, poor

ity of care); id. § 3008 (reducing Medicare payments to hospitals for hospital acquired medical conditions); id. § 3021 (creating the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation “to
test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures”); id.
§ 3022 (authorizing shared savings with Medicare and Medicaid providers who create accountable care organizations that meet quality and cost targets); id. § 3023 (authorizing
pilot program for bundled Medicare payments); id. § 3024 (authorizing demonstration project to test Medicare payment incentive and service delivery models for primary care); id. §
3025 (reducing Medicare payments for certain hospital readmissions); id. § 3102 (adjusting
Medicare physician payment calculations); id. §§ 3131-3132 (adjusting Medicare payments
for home health care and hospice care); id. § 3133 (reducing Medicare payments to disproportionate share hospitals); id. § 3134 (providing for review and adjustment of Medicare
physician payment claims); id. §§ 3135, 3136 (limiting Medicare payments for imaging and
powered wheel chairs); id. § 3138 (proving for study of cancer hospital costs); id. § 3139
(limiting Medicare payments for generic biologics); id. § 3140 (authorizing demonstration
projects of Medicare hospice program models); id. § 3201 (amending Medicare Advantage
payment method); id. § 3313 (authorizing Inspector General to study prescription drug
prices for Medicare Part D covered drugs); id. § 3401 (amending market basket bases and
adding productivity requirements to Medicare payment calculations); id. § 3403 (creating
Medicare Payment Advisory Board to “reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare
spending”); id. § 3501 (expanding Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s authority
to conduct research on health care quality, safety and value); id. §§ 5001–5701 (including
provisions to encourage students to enter primary care, nursing, geriatrics, public health,
and allied health professions); id. § 6001 (tightening limitations on physician self-referrals);
id. § 6301 (creating an independent Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to study
the effectiveness of medical care); id. § 10606 (increasing penalties for health care fraud).
See also, MATTHEW BUETTGENS ET AL., AMERICA UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 11
(2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412267-america-under-aca.pdf
(estimating savings in the cost of uncompensated care).
7. About 50 million Americans have some kind of disability and about 10 million received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance. More
Than 50 Million Americans Report Some Level of Disability, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 12,
2006), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/aging_population/cb06-71.html.
See Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., Chronic Conditions Account for Rise in Medicare Spending
from 1987 to 2006, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 718 (2010); Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons with
Chronic Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 1476 (1996). See also
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW DOES OBESITY IN ADULTS AFFECT SPENDING ON HEALTH
CARE? (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11810/09-08Obesity_brief.pdf.
8. Heart disease, cancers, stroke, chronic respiratory diseases, Alzheimer’s disease,
and diabetes caused 64.5% of deaths in 2009. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2009, 59 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 5, 29 tbl.29 (2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_04.pdf. Chronic disease costs may also
threaten the global economy. DAVID E. BLOOM ET AL., THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF
NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 35 (2011), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_Harvard_HE_GlobalEconomicBurdenNonCommunicableDiseases_2011.pdf (a report
for the World Economic Forum, estimating that heart disease, stroke, cancers, chronic
respiratory diseases, diabetes, and mental illness account for 63% of deaths worldwide
(72% in high income countries) and could cost a total of $30 trillion worldwide between now
and 2030).
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9
diet, and alcohol and tobacco use. It is not surprising, therefore,
that policy recommendations to control chronic disease costs emphasize policies to change such behaviors.10 The ACA follows this
trend. Its provisions regulating both public and private insurance
include required coverage of preventive care without patient cost
sharing and authorization to provide incentives for individuals to
participate in wellness programs.11 While these provisions are
generally applauded as promoting good health, their potential for
discriminating against people who are overweight, poor, disadvantaged or have chronic ailments has begun to raise concern.12
This article examines whether insurance is an appropriate
mechanism for improving individual health or reducing the cost of
health care for payers, and if so, what principles can guide the
design of insurance for either purpose. Insurance is the quintessential tool for spreading and managing risk. However, insurance

9. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., L EADING H EALTH INDICATORS FOR H EALTHY P EOPLE
2020—L ETTER R EPORT (2011), available at http://iom.edu/Reports/2011/Leading-HealthIndicators-for-Healthy-People-2020.aspx; NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION
AND HEALTH PROMOTION, THE POWER OF PREVENTION: CHRONIC DISEASE . . . THE PUBLIC
HEALTH CHALLENGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
chronicdisease/pdf/2009-Power-of-Prevention.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS
REPORT ON NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 2010 (2011), available at http://www.
who.int/nmh/publications/ncd_report2010/en/. The seminal work identifying behavioral
risk factors as the underlying cause of many diseases is J. Michael McGinnis & William F.
Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207 (1993).
10. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC
DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, AT A GLANCE 2010: HEALTH RISKS IN THE
UNITED STATES:
BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/AAG/brfss.htm; NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010
FINAL REVIEW LHI-3-9 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hpdata2010/
hp2010_final_review.pdf (reporting that the top 10 “leading health indicators” were physical activity, nutrition and obesity, tobacco use, substance abuse, responsible sexual behavior, mental health, injury and violence, environmental quality, immunization, and access to
health care). But see Leading Health Indicators: 2020 LHI Topics, HEALTHY PEOPLE.GOV,
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/LHI/2020indicators.aspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2012)
(reversing the order of many indicators to lead with access to health care, clinical preventive services, and environmental quality).
11. See infra Part III.
12. See, e.g., Jennifer Bard, When Public Health and Genetic Privacy Collide: Positive
and Normative Theories Explaining How ACA’s Expansion of Corporate Wellness Programs
Conflicts with GINA’s Privacy Rules, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 469 (2011); Nurit Guttmann,
On Being Responsible: Ethical Issues in Appeals to Personal Responsibility in Health Campaigns, 6 J. H EALTH COMM . 117 (2010); Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy, and
Ethics of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
450 (2011); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health
Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199 (2008); Mark A. Rothstein & Heather L. Harrell, Health
Risk Reduction Programs in Employer-Sponsored Health Plans: Part II—Law and Ethics,
51 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL MED. 951 (2009); Robert Steinbrook, Imposing Personal
Responsibility for Health, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 753, 753 (2006).
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risk management targets financial losses or costs; it is not typically designed to improve the policyholder’s physical or mental
wellbeing (beyond the presumed “peace of mind” of having insur13
ance). At the same time, insurance does play a significant role in
shaping public attitudes toward responsibility for health risks,14 as
described in Part II. I argue that, by establishing a new, seemingly universal design for the medical care that society should
make available and what individuals should do to protect their
own health, the ACA contains implicit standards for the allocation
of responsibility for health. Part III briefly describes the ACA’s
provisions governing preventive care coverage and wellness programs that suggest these implicit standards. In practice, wellness
programs typically seek to change a limited set of personal traits,
like obesity, or behaviors, like smoking. Thus, Part IV summarizes the evidence of the effects of preventive care and employee
wellness programs, which suggest somewhat more success in making people feel better than in reducing costs.
Because insurance provides the financial foundation for so
many institutions in the national economy, Part V explores how
the ACA’s use of insurance to encourage personal responsibility
for risk prevention may influence social attitudes and policies
about conditions of employment, housing, and social relationships.
A different approach, using community-based programs instead of
insurance-based wellness programs, is discussed in Part V. I conclude, in Part VI, that health promotion should be encouraged,
because health is valuable for its own sake. Insurance, however,
is poorly suited to improve health or manage behavioral risks to
health. Rather, it operates best as a mechanism for financing access to preventive care without cost-sharing. Although insurance
can determine actuarially fair premiums, its tools are too crude to
attribute to specific behaviors the health care costs of chronic conditions with complex causes. Characterizing ill health as the
product of individual choice—an individual responsibility—poses
credible risks to the legal rights and economic conditions of many
disadvantaged populations in the United States. Wellness programs that reward good health or penalize unhealthy behaviors
are likely to shape public perceptions of individual social worth
13. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims
Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 T EX. L. REV. 1395, 1401, 1405 (1994).
14. Mariner, supra note 12; SMOKING P OLICY: L AW , P OLITICS & CULTURE 6, 185-88
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 1993).
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and justify abusive practices, such as denying employment, on the
pretext of improving public health. If such programs are to offer
the benefits of improved health without marginalizing a growing
population, the laws governing health insurance plans should not
permit individual financial rewards or penalties for wellness program participation. Instead, such programs should be offered independently of insurance.
II. INSURANCE REFLECTS AND SHAPES CONCEPTIONS OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK
Insurance underpins most of the American—indeed the global—
economy, making it possible for businesses to operate normally as
well as to take entrepreneurial risks.15 Few businesses can operate without several types of insurance, including general liability,
directors’ liability, and casualty insurance. By setting conditions
on issuing such policies and requiring the performance of other
conditions after issuance, insurers influence financial and commercial behavior. Like most insurers, health insurers often obtain
reinsurance and design their policies to meet the requirements of
the reinsurer.16 Even common personal and social activities, such
as buying a motor vehicle and obtaining a home mortgage, require
the purchase of insurance as a condition precedent. Jeffrey Stempel summarizes the breadth and depth of this influence, concluding that “[i]nsurance policies serve a function in the social ordering of personal and economic activity. . . . [T]hey serve as part of
the infrastructure by which such activity is conducted.” 17
The influence of insurance is beginning to be seen as a form of
governance itself.18 National social welfare systems for pensions,
unemployment compensation, and health care operate as insurance systems and may use private insurers to administer costs

15. For histories of insurance, see JOHN A. BOGARDUS, JR., SPREADING THE RISKS:
INSURING THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (2003) and ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS
(1992).
16. Reinsurance is insurance for insurers. Insurance companies transfer some of the
risk they assumed from policyholders to a reinsurance company. ROBERT H. JERRY II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, § 140a, 1015 (4th ed. 2007); Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 350 (2009).
17. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2010).
18. RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 45 (2003) (initiating sociological research on insurance as an institution of governance by private entities and describing the results of the empirical study).
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19
and claims. Of course, governments also authorize, by licensing,
private insurers to directly underwrite specific risks, such as
workers compensation and health benefit plans. Increasingly,
however, governments rely on private insurance companies to
provide the financial security needed for commercial businesses to
operate,20 a way of managing risks that could be considered the
function of governments. The insurance policy requirements serve
to partially govern commercial operations and policyholders’ conduct,21 lessening the need for formal legal rules, but performing a
similar function and without public accountability.
Insurance governs from behind the scene. In the background, its
influence can be invisible or taken for granted. Yet the content of
insurance policies shapes public opinion about acceptable risks
and appropriate responses to risks.22 One way in which this happens is by the standardization of insurance terms.23 Most health
24
insurance policies are standard form contracts. Standard form
contracts have characteristics analogous to standardized product
specifications.25 Coverage choices—which risks are covered or excluded—that are standard features of insurance policies begin to
look like essential elements of an acceptable product, just as having seatbelts in automobiles were regarded first as acceptable,

19. See T HE EVOLUTION OF S OCIAL INSURANCE 1881-1981 (Peter A. Kohler & Hans
F. Zacher eds., 1982). Medicare, for example, contracts with private insurers to administer
Medicare benefits. Processing of Claims for Part A and Part B: Enterprise Architecture,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1-1
(2006), available at www.cms.gov/MedicareContractingReform/downloads/ProcessingClaims
forPartA&BEnterpriseArchitecture.pdf.
20. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 45.
21. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM . L. REV. 629, 631 (1943) (describing how “standard clauses in insurance
policies” enable insurers to “select and control risks assumed under a contract”).
22. See generally P AUL SLOVIC, T HE P ERCEPTION OF RISK (2000) (describing approaches to risk perception).
23. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (noting that almost all contracts used standard
forms and provisions).
24. Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 1, 34, 37 (1998) (arguing that most health insurance contracts should be interpreted
as standard form contracts issued without bargaining on the part of the individual policyholder); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 108
(2007) (critiquing the emphasis on interpreting text in insurance policies).
25. Although most lawyers classify insurance policies as contracts, the health insurance industry refers to insurance policies as “products.” Products can be regulated to protect consumers from hidden hazards. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as
Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 831 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 W M . & MARY L. REV.
1389, 1395 (2007).
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then as a necessary feature. When particular product specifications become standard features, they can create an expectation
and a social norm. Similarly, when specific medical conditions are
excluded from coverage or covered only at a higher premium, such
conditions appear to be outside the norm.
Insurance can “govern” behavior by establishing norms of conduct.26 The norm in insurance is constructed on the basis of empirical estimates of the distribution of risk in a population, not a
social ideal.27 The statistical mean is merely descriptive of a population. People with a risk profile near the mean are normal.
However, such statistical data can be seen in moral terms, where
normal acquires a moral meaning. People with a risk profile at
either extreme of the curve can be seen as outliers or even pathological.28 Ian Hacking argues that awareness of risk data has
“looping effects,” in which the knowledge of what is statistically
normal creates pressure to be normal, narrowing the scope of
normal and widening the range of the abnormal or excessively
risky.29 This suggests that people may assign normative values or
30
moral weight to risk probabilities. Moral judgments are easily
hidden in the probabilistic language of risk, because probabilities
appear to be objective.
More than any other industry, insurance depends on quantifying the probability of an unwanted occurrence and the probable
harm produced if it occurs. Insurance thus appears to transform
danger into a manageable risk calculation.31 A manageable risk
appears to be subject to human control. Thus, those with higher
risks can be seen as failing to prevent their own problems; they
can be seen as out of control.32 For example, studies on the causes
of car accidents led to changing the name from accident to motor
26. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as a Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. L.J. 11, 46 (1999-2000).
27. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 68-69.
28. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 2 (1990).
29. Id.
30. See P AUL SLOVIC, T HE F EELING OF RISK: N EW P ERSPECTIVES ON RISK
P ERCEPTION (2011) (discussing various ways in which cultural factors influence perceptions of risk).
31. But see P ETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: T HE REMARKABLE S TORY OF
RISK (1998); RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK,
INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (2004) (describing the uncertainty of actuarial
risk estimates).
32. For arguments that the literature on risk portrays an increasing number of risks as
being under human control and, therefore, that the responsibility for avoiding the ensuing
harms should belong to the individual, see JOHN ADAMS, RISK (1995) and JAMES REASON,
H UMAN ERROR (1990).
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vehicle crashes, to emphasize the responsibility of drivers or vehi33
cle design for safety.
Insurance, then, is not only a way to manage the financial cost
of risks; it also allocates responsibility for risks.34 Responsibility is
often thought of as falling into two categories: personal responsibility and collective responsibility—which can include broad, social or governmental responsibility and smaller, private group or
community responsibility.35 As a form of mutual aid and collective
responsibility, insurance influences how people perceive risks.36 If
insurance is not available for a risk, like hurricane coverage in
coastal Florida or investigational drugs, it suggests that the risk is
too great or too uncertain to spread in any fair way. Those who
choose to live in that zone or participate in research should understand that they are on their own if disaster strikes. If insurance is
easily available, it might suggest that the risk is small or that it is
so common that it can be easily spread. Such risks may appear
normal, if not enticing. In this way, as Deborah Stone writes, insurance serves to identify risks that are seen as “amenable to human agency and collective action.”37 Thus, decisions about what
risks to cover embody implicit normative judgments about what
risks should be shared or remedied together. Covered risks are
seen as a collective responsibility, while excluded risks remain the
personal responsibility of individuals.
Whether insurance is sited in the public or private sector offers
another clue as to whether the risks it covers are viewed as a social responsibility or a personal one. Government-required social
insurance systems like Social Security and unemployment insurance reflect the idea that society should protect people from destitution in old age or lack of work.38 The fact that life insurance re33. Ericson et al., supra note 18, at 270.
34. Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (Tom
Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
35. Id.; Mariner, supra note 12, at 205-07.
36. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 287, 279, 314 (1993). See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN
CULTURAL T HEORY (1990).
37. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 54 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds.,
2002).
38. Perhaps the best known arguments over social insurance are contained in Kenneth
J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941
(1963) (generally for) and Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968) (generally against).
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mains available only from private commercial companies suggests
that it is an option for individuals and, therefore, only a personal
39
responsibility. The ACA’s minimum coverage requirement moves
health insurance in the United States away from the personal responsibility model and much closer to a social insurance model.40
In European countries with social insurance systems, the introduction of competitive market reforms has sometimes raised concerns that such reforms dilute the culture of solidarity.41
As everyone knows, health insurance spreads risk by pooling
premium revenues from all individuals in a group to pay for losses
incurred—medical care obtained—by individuals in the group.42
In effect, the healthy—those who incur few or no costs—subsidize
the group members who do get care that is covered by the health
insurance plan. Few insurers, or policyholders for that matter,
speak of a group insurance plan as a subsidy to the ill or unhealthy.43 Rather, this form of subsidy appears to be accepted as
quite normal by those who buy the coverage, suggesting that buyers consider the covered risks to be matters for collective action.
On the other hand, policyholders often seek to join the lowest risk
(and least expensive) group, thereby disaggregating the sphere of
collective action into smaller groups.44 Insurers in an unregulated,
voluntary market segment the market by classifying risks into
smaller groups.45 Thus, the strength of the spirit of solidarity may
depend on the price of insurance and the degree to which people
prefer not to be classified as a high risk. Risk classification itself
39. Histories of commercial life insurance in the United States suggest that it gained
consumer acceptance when characterized as a way for individuals to take responsibility for
providing for their families in the event the breadwinner died. See, e.g., VIVIANA A.
ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979); Brian J. Glenn, God and the Red Umbrella: The Place of Values in
the Creation of Institutions of Mutual Assistance, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 277 (2004).
40. Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to Do with It? Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436, 438
(2010).
41. See, e.g., Karl Hinrichs, The Impact of German Health Insurance Reforms on Redistribution and the Culture of Solidarity, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 653 (1995); Hans
Maarse & Aggie Paulus, Has Solidarity Survived? A Comparative Analysis of the Effect of
Social Health Insurance Reform in Four European Countries, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
585 (2003).
42. See generally KENNETH S ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION (2d ed.
1995); JERRY II, supra note 16.
43. Stone, supra note 36, at 292.
44. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 662 (2008).
45. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003).
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may influence perceptions of responsibility for risk by encouraging
segregation into economically favored and disfavored groups.
The ACA is legislation that may shift Americans’ conception of
health insurance, but insurance can also influence law. For example, Kenneth Abraham argues persuasively that the availability of liability insurance enabled tort liability claims that would
have been uncollectable in the absence of insurance.46 A common
complaint among some economists is that insurance distorts the
market for health care, encouraging excessive use of services and
rising prices by removing the buyer’s awareness of the cost of
care.47 This complaint may have limited application to medical
services, however, because physicians, not patients, make the major decisions about what kind of care a patient should receive.
And, sick patients are unlikely to “shop around” for the cheapest
hospital, whether or not they have insurance.
Nevertheless, health insurance may influence public policy by
suggesting that the services that are covered are a social responsibility, while those that are excluded or subject to cost-sharing are
matters of personal choice. Social policy has influenced health
insurance by requiring health insurers to cover many preventive
services that would not ordinarily be covered in a conventional
indemnity insurance policy.48 Such coverage is intended to encourage individuals to get the preventive services that they might
not otherwise get, often because of cost, with the expectation that
those services may help to prevent future illness.49 Although
property and casualty insurers sometimes require their policyholders to keep their property reasonably maintained as a condition of coverage, health insurers have not required individuals to
stay healthy as a condition of continued health insurance coverage. Of course, until some state laws and now the ACA required
guaranteed issue, insurers did not have to sell a policy to anyone
with a preexisting condition or, alternatively, could exclude cover46. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008). See also Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort
Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS.
L.J. 1 (2005).
47. See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM . ECON. REV. 941 (1963); W. Henry Chiu, Health Insurance and the Welfare of
Health Care Consumers, 64 J. P UB. ECON. 125 (1996); Martin S. Feldstein, The Rising
Price of Physicians’ Services, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 121 (1970); Martin S. Feldstein, The
Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. P OL. ECON. 251 (1973).
48. Mariner, supra note 40, at 445.
49. Id.
THE
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age of preexisting conditions. With the ACA’s new requirements,
the question is whether health insurers and employers can require
policyholders to “maintain” their bodies in the same way that other insurers require automobile owners to perform regular car
maintenance.

III. ACA INSURANCE PROVISIONS TO PROMOTE HEALTH
The ACA has three different approaches to promoting health:
(1) encouraging and funding government and community research,
education, and projects to improve health and provide healthpromoting conditions;51 (2) requiring coverage of preventive health
services in public and private health insurance programs;52 and (3)
authorizing both state Medicaid plans and private health insurance plans, including those sponsored by employers, to offer wellness programs.53 The first two approaches are not controversial,
because they offer benefits to all, without requiring participation
50. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (requiring guaranteed issue); § 300gg-2 (prohibiting preexisting
condition exclusions).
51. Title IV of the ACA, “Prevention of Chronic Disease and Improving Public Health,”
is one of nine substantive titles. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, §§ 4001-4306, 124 Stat. 119, 538-587 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 29
and 42 U.S.C.). Most of the sections in this title authorize federal funding for preventive
health services, id. § 4101, 124 Stat. at 546 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280h-4 to -5) (grants to
operate school health centers), education, id. § 4102, 124 Stat. at 550 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 280k-3) (creating an educational campaign for oral healthcare prevention and grants for
research on dental caries prevention), and outreach, id. § 4004, 124 Stat. at 544 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300u-12) (creating an education and outreach program to “encourage[] healthy
behaviors linked to the prevention of chronic diseases”). A “Prevention and Public Health
Fund” was established to pay for many of these programs. Id. § 4002, 124 Stat. at 541
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300u-11). The Fund, originally enacted to receive $15 billion over
ten years ($5 billion in its first five years), may suffer from deficit budget-cutting. Id. The
President has already proposed reducing the fund by $3.5 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIVING WITHIN OUR MEANS AND INVESTING IN
THE FUTURE: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEFICIT REDUCTION
(2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2012/assets/jointcommitteereport.pdf.
52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001, 124 Stat. at 1301 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-13) (private coverage of preventive services); id. § 4103, 124 Stat. at 553
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)) (Medicare coverage of annual wellness visit without
cost sharing); id. § 4104, 124 Stat. at 557 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x) (Medicare coverage
of preventive services recommended by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force); id. §
4106, 124 Stat. at 559 (Medicaid coverage of preventive services for adults); id. § 4107, 124
Stat. at 560 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)) (coverage of tobacco cessation services for
pregnant Medicaid beneficiaries). An independent Preventive Services Task Force, affiliated with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, was created to review and
recommend clinical preventive services for coverage. Id. § 4003(a), 124 Stat. at 541 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-4). For services covered, see Recommendations, U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force, www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/recommendations.htm.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 300gg-4. See infra text accompanying notes 57-110.
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54

or imposing financial penalties on non-participation. In contrast,
the third approach allows employers and insurers to hold nonparticipating or unsuccessful plan enrollees responsible for a larger share of costs than other enrollees. These provisions use insurance to try to reduce individual health risks. Although the
ACA’s insurance regulation provisions generally eliminate risk
segmentation within insurance pools, for example, by requiring
guaranteed issue and coverage of preexisting conditions,55 the
wellness program provisions reintroduce some risk segmentation
into the plan’s pool of enrollees.56 This element has the potential
to reshape laws governing discrimination, particularly in employment.
The ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs expands an exception to the prohibition against discrimination among group
health plan enrollees in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).57 Although that section prohibited
group health insurance plans from discriminating with respect to
premiums or eligibility or benefits on the basis of “health factors,”58 it allowed plans to offer premium discounts or rebates or
modify cost-sharing for “adherence to programs of health promotion and disease prevention.”59 Regulations adopted in 2006
60
fleshed out the types of programs that qualified for the exception.
The ACA’s version of this provision expands this exception by
allowing insurers to offer wellness programs in both the individual
54. See § 4003(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-10) (creating a separate Community
Preventive Services Task Force, convened by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to review population-based services).
55. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1) (guaranteed issue); id.
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2) (guaranteed renewability); id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-3) (prohibition against preexisting condition exclusions); § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11) (prohibition on lifetime and annual limits); id. (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12) (prohibition on rescission). See Mariner, supra note 12, at 222 (describing how wellness programs can reintroduce risk rating into the pool of insureds).
56. Mariner, supra note 12, at 222.
57. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4). The original provision is
also included in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2010) and
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 9802 (2006).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (Supp. III 2009). Health factors were defined to include:
“health status; medical condition (including both physical and mental illnesses); claims
experience; receipt of health care; medical history; genetic information; evidence of insurability (including conditions arising out of acts of violence); and disability. Id. The ACA
changed the term “health factor” to “health status-related factors” and added “any other
health status-related factor determined appropriate by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services” to the definition. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2012).
59. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f) (2011); 42 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1 (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(f)
(2011). See Mariner, supra note 12, at 219 (describing the 2006 regulations).
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61
and group market. It also incorporates the requirements of the
2006 regulations into a new subsection (j), which divides wellness
programs into those that can be offered freely and those that must
meet additional requirements to be considered non-discriminatory.62 Several of the five categories of wellness programs that
do not have to meet additional requirements appear to offer beneficial services.63 These include programs that pay for all or part of
membership in a fitness center or smoking cessation programs or
that offer a reward for attending periodic health education seminars.64 They also include a “program that encourages preventive
care related to a health condition through the waiver of the copayment or deductible requirement under a group health plan for
the cost of certain items or services related to a health condition
(such as prenatal care or well-baby visits).”65 This could be a welcome benefit in grandfathered, employer-sponsored group health
plans that do not waive cost-sharing for preventive services. It is
possible, of course, that individuals who are encouraged to use
these services could perceive the attention as singling them out for
their unfavorable health conditions. Employee reactions may depend on whether all employees, including individuals who are
quite fit, are encouraged to attend health education programs and
whether their employers track attendance.
The last wellness program in the exempt list is one that rewards
individuals for participating in a diagnostic testing program, as
long as it does not base the reward on an individual’s test outcomes.66 This seems intended to encourage people to identify any
health problems they have, so that they can take appropriate action. Here again, however, if the test results are tracked by employers, employees may fear other forms of employment discrimination, either because of a discovered health problem or an individual’s failure to treat it. Commercial companies that sell wellness programs to insurers and employers often emphasize the importance of screening employees for health conditions in order to
permit personalized health promotion and disease management

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a).
Id. § 300gg-4(j).
Id. § 300gg-4(j)(2).
Id.
Id. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(C).
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(B).
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67
plans. Thus, a testing program is often the beginning of more
targeted incentives directed at individual employees.
The second category of permissible programs can offer rewards
and penalties based on a person’s health status as long as they
meet four relatively simple requirements.68 First, the program
must be “reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease.”69 However, the program also must not be “overly burdensome” or “a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status
factor.”70 Despite this appropriately cautionary language, it
should be relatively easy to justify programs aimed at behaviors
that are generally believed to increase the risk of chronic diseases
in large populations. Second, the reward opportunity must be offered annually, which is a very simple condition to meet.71
Third, the reward opportunity must be available to all similarly
situated individuals, which generally means everyone in the insurance pool or worksite, which is a seemingly simple requirement.72 However, a reward is not considered to be available to all
if some individuals cannot meet the reward requirements, such as
lowered cholesterol or weight loss.73 To retain the exempt status of
the program, it must offer an alternative standard to be met by
individuals who find it “unreasonably difficult due to a medical
condition” to meet the regular standard or for whom it would be
“medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy”74 the regular standard. This appears to be a solicitous addition. However, the provision notes that the plan “may seek verification [of the medical
difficulties] from an individual’s physician.”75 The 2006 regulations, which appear to serve as the template for these statutory
sections, offer examples of “alternative standards” in such cases,
which include following the advice of the individual’s physician,
such as taking medication and getting blood tests.76 Thus, it
would be permissible for a plan to require a person to follow a
physician’s recommendations in order to qualify for any reward.

67. HA T. TU & RALPH C. MAYRELL, EMPLOYER WELLNESS INITIATIVES GROW, BUT
EFFECTIVENESS VARIES WIDELY 2 (2010), available at http://www.nihcr.org/EmployerWellness-Programs.pdf.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3).
69. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(C).
72. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i).
74. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i)(I), (II).
75. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(ii).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)(ex. 3), (ex. 4).
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The fourth requirement limits the amount of any reward to 30%
of an individual’s total premium, including both the employer and
77
This represents an increase from the
employee contributions.
20% limit in the 2006 regulations.78 The reward can be in the form
of a premium discount, a waiver of cost-sharing, or the absence of
a surcharge.79 In other words, the reward can function as a penalty for those who do not receive it.80 In 2010, the average annual
premium for employer-sponsored group health insurance for individual coverage was $5,049,81 which could allow an additional
payment of $1,515 for non-participants or unsuccessful participants. If the employee’s family is eligible to participate in a wellness program, the additional payment could apply to the price of
family coverage, which averaged $13,770 in 2010. Premiums for
independently purchased health insurance, such as policies purchased through a future health insurance exchange, generally are
higher than employer-sponsored plan premiums, so that wellness
program rewards and penalty payments under such policies could
be correspondingly larger. Moreover, the ACA authorizes the Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury
to increase the maximum additional payments to 50% of the total
cost of premiums “if the Secretaries determine that such an increase is appropriate.”82 If the Secretaries base their determination on the somewhat optimistic literature on wellness programs,
an increase is likely.83
Health insurers and group health plans are to report annually
to the Secretary on the results of wellness programs, as well as
other quality measures, such as medication and care compliance
initiatives, and activities to prevent hospital readmission, improve
patient safety, and reduce medical errors.84 The wellness programs are permitted to include smoking cessation, weight management, physical fitness, nutrition, health disease prevention,

77. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)(ex. 1)(ii); 42 C.F.R. §54.9802-1(f) (2011); 45 C.F.R. §
146.121(f)(3)(ex. 1)(ii) (2011).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 300-4(j)(3)(A).
80. See 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(f)(3)(ex. 2)(i), (ex. 5)(i)-(ii).
81. Gary Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2010: Premiums Rise Modestly, Workers Pay
More Toward Coverage, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1942, 1943 (2010).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).
83. See infra Part IV.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17 (2010). For a discussion of the patient safety provisions, see
generally Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. P A . L. REV. 1727 (2011).
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85
However,
healthy lifestyle support, and diabetes prevention.
they are not allowed to collect information about or deny discounts
on the basis of lawful possession of firearms.86
The ACA also authorizes federal grants to state Medicaid programs to “provide incentives to Medicaid beneficiaries who ‘successfully participate’ in wellness programs and ‘demonstrate
changes in health risk and outcome, including the adoption and
maintenance of healthy behaviors by meeting specific targets.’”87
The eligible programs are those that succeed in one or more of the
following: (1) ceasing use of tobacco; (2) controlling or reducing
weight; (3) lowering cholesterol; (4) lowering blood pressure; and
(5) avoiding the onset of diabetes or, in the case of a diabetic, improving the management of that condition.88 States are required
to track and validate beneficiary progress, as well as evaluate the
program’s effectiveness.89 What counts as a permissible incentive
is not specified in the Act. If the programs must “validate” beneficiary progress, however, states may try to use more coercive incentives than would be permitted in private health plans.90
The ACA encourages experimentation with wellness programs
in other ways.91 The Departments of Health and Human Services,
Treasury, and Labor are to create demonstration projects for ten
states to have health insurers implement wellness programs that
comply with the above ACA requirements.92 The programs are not
to decrease insurance coverage or trigger additional federal tax
credits or subsidies for people to obtain health coverage.93 The
Secretaries are to report to Congress on whether such programs
are effective in “promoting health and preventing disease,” their
impact on “access to care and affordability of coverage,” their ef-

85. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(b).
86. Id. § 300gg-17(c).
87. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4108(a)(1)(i), (ii),
124 Stat. 119, 561 (2010).
88. Id. § 4108(a)(3)(A)(i)-(v), 124 Stat. at 561.
89. Id. § 4108(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 562.
90. Prior to the ACA’s enactment, several states (Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) obtained Medicaid waivers to begin wellness programs. See
JESSICA GREENE, MEDICAID EFFORTS TO INCENTIVIZE HEALTHY BEHAVIORS 8-9 (2007), available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaid_Efforts_to_Incentivize_Healthy_Behaviors.pdf.
91. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4206, 124 Stat. at 576 (demonstration
project concerning individualized wellness plan); § 4303, 124 Stat. at 582 (codified at 280l
to -3) (CDC and employer-based wellness programs). See Howard K. Koh & Kathleen G.
Sebelius, Promoting Prevention Through the Affordable Care Act, 363 N EW ENG. J. MED.
1296 (2010).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(l) (2010).
93. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010) (tax credits); 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (subsidies).
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fect on “changing behavior,” and the “effectiveness of different
94
The requirement to analyze the effects of
types of rewards.”
wellness programs is welcome. However, one might ask what
would happen if the analysis found either that major health improvements substantially increased costs or that significant cost
savings failed to noticeably prevent disease.
Because large employers are more likely to be able to offer both
health insurance and wellness programs, the Act provides grants
for small employers to provide wellness programs95 and funds the
CDC to allow it to provide technical assistance.96 Group health
plan premiums are community rated, so that all members of the
group pay the same amount, regardless of their individual health
risks. Although the ACA limits and smooths insurance premium
rates for qualified plans offered in health insurance exchanges,97 it
permits higher premium rates to account for geographic area, age,
and smoking.98 Rates for tobacco use cannot be more than 1.5
times the standard premium.99 In effect, however, the use of wellness programs could create a special rate band of between 130 and
150% of the group rate for persons who fail to participate in wellness programs or meet health standards.100 For persons who fail
to stop using tobacco products, a wellness program penalty, together with a permitted rate differential, could increase their
health insurance premiums to 180% of the group premium (200%
if the wellness program penalty is increased to 50% in the future).
Thus, a $5,000 annual premium could rise as high as $9,000.
The emphasis on health promotion is evident throughout the
Act. The Act creates a National Prevention, Health Promotion,
and Public Health Council, chaired by the Surgeon General, within the Department of Health and Human Services, to make “recommendations to the President and Congress concerning the most
pressing health issues confronting the United States and changes
in Federal policy to achieve national wellness, health promotion,
94. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(m).
95. Id. § 280l-1 (note).
96. Id. § 280l.
97. The Act imposes minimum medical loss ratios, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(b)(3), risk corridors, id. § 18062, allows risk adjustments, id. § 18063, and requires reinsurance for “highrisk” enrollees in individual plans offered in health insurance exchanges, id. § 18061. Between 50 and 100 “high-risk” conditions or diagnoses are to be identified. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1). Rates for older adults cannot be more than three times the
standard premium. Id. Rate can also vary for individual versus family coverage. Id.
99. Id.
100. See text accompanying notes 76-81.
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and public health goals, including the reduction of tobacco use,
101
sedentary behavior, and poor nutrition.” The Council issued its
first “National Prevention and Health Promotion Strategy” on
June 22, 2011.102 This report properly recognizes the effects of social determinants on health:
Many of the strongest predictors of health and well-being fall
outside of the health care setting. Social, economic, and environmental factors all influence health. People with a quality
education, stable employment, safe homes and neighborhoods,
and access to high quality preventive services tend to be
healthier throughout their lives and live longer.103
Although the Report encourages social and environmental improvements, it does not recommend specific programs, beyond education, to carry them out.104 Structural changes in agricultural
policy, roadways, transportation, and the built environment would
require new legislation, which would require substantial financial
resources and could face political opposition.105
The Report’s most specific recommendations—its seven priorities—focus on personal behaviors: tobacco free living; preventing
drug abuse and excessive alcohol use; healthy eating; active living;
injury and violence free living; reproductive and sexual health;
and mental and emotional well-being.106 In particular, it encourages payers, including public health benefit programs and commercial health insurers, as well as employers, to provide wellness
programs.107
No matter how understandable the focus on personal behaviors
is, it may miss an opportunity to significantly reduce the personal
burden of chronic disease in the country. The reasons for the high
cost of chronic care are multifaceted. People with chronic diseases
typically need ongoing treatment, but many have no consistent
101. Id. § 300u-10.
102. NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, NATIONAL PREVENTION STRATEGY: AMERICA’S PLAN
FOR BETTER HEALTH AND WELLNESS (2011), available at http://www.healthcare.gov/
prevention/nphpphc/strategy/report.pdf.
103. Id. at 6. It also notes the importance of threats to health from what it calls “community stressors (e.g., job and home losses, discrimination, family separations, and violence).” Id. at 11.
104. Id.
105. See Fazal Khan, Combating Obesity through the Built Environment: Is There a
Clear Path to Success?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 387 (2011).
106. NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 7.
107. Id.
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108
Others may have no health insurance or may
source of care.
move in and out of health plans and Medicaid.109 Interruptions in
care may exacerbate illnesses, leading to more intensive and expensive acute care. The ACA takes steps to make more consistent
access to care possible by requiring health insurance to be available regardless of health status and by providing subsidies or enrollment in Medicaid for those unable to afford private insurance.110 It also provides financial incentives for providers to create
accountable care organizations to coordinate care.111 However, it
retains the existing patchwork of public and private health plans,
leaving patients, including those with chronic illnesses, vulnerable
to shifting in and out of different plans with different providers.
Thus, the most specific efforts to reduce the cost of chronic illness
fall on the individuals themselves, especially through wellness
programs, which do not require major economic or institutional
upheavals.112

IV. CHRONIC DISEASE: PREVENTION, COSTS,
AND WELLNESS PROGRAMS
A.

Chronic Disease: Prevalence and Causes

Given the general concern about the cost of chronic diseases and
the ACA’s encouragement of changing personal behaviors that
increase the risk of such diseases, it seems important to know
whether policies like wellness programs can either improve health
or control costs. First, there is good reason to focus policy recommendations on reducing the disability and discomfort caused by

108. About 45% of people with public insurance have at least two chronic conditions,
compared with one-third of people with private insurance and 16% of uninsured persons.
STEVEN MACHLIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL EXPENDITURE
PANEL SURVEY: STATISTICAL BRIEF # 320: HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND EXPENDITURES
AMONG NON-ELDERLY ADULTS WITH MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS: VARIATIONS BY
INSURANCE COVERAGE STATUS, 2007-2008 (AVERAGE ANNUAL) 1-2 (2011), available at
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st320/stat320.pdf. More than 25% of
these uninsured had no usual source of care, compared with 12.1% of those with public
insurance and 8.7% of those with private insurance. Id.
109. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes
in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 228, 232-36 (2011).
110. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1411-1415 (subsidies and tax credits); §§ 2001-2001 (expanded eligibility for Medicaid).
111. See supra note 6.
112. Starr, supra note 3, at 261 (concluding that the ACA’s wellness provision “seeks
to raise the cost of unhealthy practices”).
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113
More than half of all deaths in the United
chronic diseases.
States (54%) in 2007 were attributable to heart disease, cancers,
and stroke (53% in 2009).114 Final data on the top ten causes of
death in 2007 are shown in Table 1.115

TABLE 1: LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH, FINAL DATA FOR 2007
Cause of Death

Number

% of Total Deaths

All causes

2,423,712

100.0

Diseases of heart

616,067

25.4

Malignant neoplasms
[cancers]
Cerebrovascular diseases
[stroke]
Chronic lower respiratory
diseases
Accidents
[unintentional injuries]
Alzheimer’s disease

562,875

23.2

135,952

5.6

127,952

5.3

123,706

5.1

74,632

3.1

Diabetes mellitus

71,382

2.9

Influenza and pneumonia

52,717

2.2

Nephritis, nephritic syndrome 46,448
and nephrosis

1.9

Septicemia

1.4

34,828

Second, there is considerable evidence that certain behavioral
factors increase the risk of chronic disease.116 Like most observers,
113. P’SHIP FOR SOLUTIONS, CHRONIC CONDITIONS: MAKING THE CASE FOR ONGOING
CARE 24 (Gerard Anderson et al. eds., John Hopkins Univ., 2004) (2002), available at
http://www.partnershipforsolutions.org/DMS/files/chronicbook2004.pdf.
114. Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2007, 59 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 9
tbl.C (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_08.pdf. For a
history and explanation of the classification of causes of death, see IWAO M. MORIYAMA ET
AL., HISTORY OF THE STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND CAUSES OF DEATH
(Harry M. Rosenberg & Donna L. Hoyert eds. 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/misc/classification_diseases2011.pdf.
115. Heron, supra note 114. Preliminary data for 2009 show similar results, except that
suicide overtook septicemia as the tenth leading cause. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., supra
note 8, at 5 tbl.B.
116. See supra notes 9-10; CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK
CO. FOUND., THE STATE OF AGING AND HEALTH IN AMERICA (2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/Aging/pdf/saha_2007.pdf.
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WHO lists physical inactivity, poor diet, smoking, and harmful
alcohol use as the key behavioral risk factors for chronic dis117
Somewhat paradoxically, the prevalence of several key
eases.
risk factors for heart disease—high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and tobacco use—has declined among people in all weight
categories since 1960, the same period in which chronic disease
prevalence rose.118 A substantial body of research demonstrates
that the social determinants of health, including income, education, employment, housing, genetics, the environment, and even
political inequality, contribute significantly to the development of
chronic diseases.119 Given the multiplicity of factors contributing
to non-infectious diseases, it is difficult to tease out exactly how
much is attributable to behavior, as distinct from social determinants like genetics or unemployment, for example. The structural
factors, of course, are more resistant to change. Thus, it is not
surprising that those seeking more immediate results focus on
individual behavior.
Reports about the separate links between chronic disease, on
one hand, and behavioral risks, treatment costs, or premature
117. W ORLD H EALTH ORG., supra note 9, at vii.
118. Edward W. Gregg et al., Secular Trends in Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors
According to Body Mass in U.S. Adults, 293 JAMA 1868, 1874 (2005) (also finding that
diabetes increased).
119. See, e.g., David A. Alter et al., Lessons from Canada’s Universal Health Care: Socially Disadvantaged Patients Use More Health Services, Still Have Poorer Health, 30
H EALTH AFFs. 274 (2011); Jason Beckfield & Nancy Krieger, Epi+Demos+Cracy: Linking
Political Systems and Priorities to the Magnitude of Health Inequalities—Evidence, Gaps,
and a Research Agenda, 31 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. 152 (2009) (countries with social safety
nets tend to have fewer inequalities and fewer health disparities); Sandro Galea et al.,
Estimated Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States, 101 AM . J. P UB .
H EALTH 1456 (2011); M. David Low et al., Can Education Policy Be Health Policy? Implications of Research on the Social Determinants of Health, 30 J. H EALTH P OL. P OL’ Y & L.
1131 (2005); Jo C. Phelan et al., Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of Health Inequalities: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications, 51 J. H EALTH & SOC . BEHAV . S28
(2010); David J. Roelfs et al., Losing Life and Livelihood: A Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis of Unemployment and All-Cause Mortality, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 840 (2011); A.
Siddiqi, D. Zuberi & Q. C. Nguyen, The Role of Health Insurance in Explaining Immigrant
Versus Non-immigrant Disparities in Access to Health Care: Comparing the United States
to Canada, 69 SOC. SCI. MED. 1452 (2009); Marilyn A. Winkeby et al., Social Class Disparities in Risk Factors for Disease: Eight-Year Prevalence Patterns by Level of Education, 19
P REVENTIVE MED. 1 (1990); INSTIT. OF MED., Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (Brian D. Smedley et al., eds., 2003); N.
WALLERSTEIN, WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPOWERMENT TO IMPROVE
HEALTH?
(2006),
available
at
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/74656/E88086.pdf; WORLD H EALTH
ORG., SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: THE SOLID FACTS (Richard Wilkinson & Michael
Marmot
eds.,
2d
ed.
2003),
available
at
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0005/98438/e81384.pdf.
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120
For
death, on the other hand, can invite some rhetorical leaps.
example, in a 2007 report, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention began its description of behavioral factors that cause
disease with the heading “More than one-third of U.S. deaths are
preventable.”121 This is nonsense, of course. In the long run, no
one’s death is preventable. Similarly, a video on the website
homepage of HealthMedia, Inc., which sells digital coaching programs, claims “seventy percent of healthcare costs can be prevented through behavior change.”122 Would that it were true.
About 75% of deaths from chronic diseases worldwide occur among
those over sixty years of age.123 At least in the developed world,
people are escaping infectious diseases and accidents and living
long enough to succumb to heart diseases, stroke, and cancers.
The most likely general consensus is that we all hope to prevent
disabling conditions that make life difficult, especially among the
young. Therefore, to the extent that disabling conditions can be
prevented—and, ideally, the years of healthy life increased—
preventive measures are to be greatly desired.
Whether prevention can reduce the costs of chronic diseases is a
different question. Certainly, worry about such costs is widespread. And, it is logical to believe that a reduction in chronic disease would also reduce treatment costs. The National Prevention
Strategy states that prevention can lower health care costs.124 A
report for the World Economic Forum estimated that in 2010,
worldwide direct and indirect costs were $863 billion for cardiovascular diseases, $500 billion for diabetes, $458 billion for cancers, $2.1 trillion for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and
$2.5 trillion for mental illnesses.125 A recent study estimates that
the total costs of obesity in the U.S. could be as high as $147 bil-

120. For example, an estimate of the number of deaths caused by behavioral factors was
critiqued and later corrected in part by the authors. Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of
Death in the United States 2000, 291 JAMA 1238, 1243-45 (2004) (concluding that modifiable behavioral risk factors are the leading causes of mortality in the United States); Ali H.
Mokdad et al., Correction: Actual Causes of Death in the United States 2000, 293 JAMA
293, 293 (2005).
121. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK CO. FOUND., supra
note 116, at iii.
122. HEALTHMEDIA SOLUTIONS, http://healthmedia.com/index.htm#/300 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011). Such claims appear to confuse research attributing between 50% to 70% of
health care costs in certain populations to chronic disease and separate findings that certain behaviors are associated with the development of chronic diseases.
123. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 9, at ix.
124. NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 6.
125. BLOOM ET AL., supra note 8.
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126
The federal government is obviously concerned, because
lion.
Medicare pays an estimated 23% of these costs, while Medicaid
pays an estimated 19%.127 However, the study that estimated these costs also estimated that, without obesity, costs would only be
7% to 11% lower.128
Studies of chronic disease costs require some parsing. Most
studies are based on separate estimates of the prevalence of a
chronic disease like heart disease, risk factors like obesity for
heart disease, and the costs of services for diseases for which obesity is a risk factor. Actual data on the costs of care for illnesses
that are caused by obesity alone are hard to find. Many researchers use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (“MEPS”), a periodic survey of a representative national sample of the civilian noninstitutionalized population that asks about medical spending,
health insurance status, health status, and body mass index
(“BMI”), or the National Expenditures Accounts, which also includes institutionalized adults.129 Different studies use different
time periods (e.g., annual or lifetime), different populations (e.g.,
elderly, non-elderly, or children), and different types of costs (e.g.,
medical care, all health expenditures, or government expenditures, including disability and pension payments).130 There is general agreement that the cost of medical care to treat chronic conditions is increasing, but there are several possible reasons for the
increase, not all of them easily amenable to prevention. For example, much of the cost has been attributed to the growing proportion of elderly in the population,131 the increased costs of medi-

126. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer—and Service—Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFFS. w822, w828-w831 (2009). See also
Angela B. Mariotto et al., Projections of the Cost of Cancer Care in the United States: 2010–
2020, 103 J. N AT’ L. CANCER INST. 117, 126 (2011); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7.
127. Justine G. Trogdon et al., State—and Payer—Specific Estimates of Annual Medical
Expenditures Attributable to Obesity, 20 OBESITY 214 (2011), available at http://www.
nature.com/oby/journal/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/oby2011169a.pdf.
128. Id. at 4.
129. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, begun in 1996, is described at Survey
Background, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.meps.
ahrq.gov/mepsweb/about_meps/survey_back.jsp (last updated August 21, 2009).
130. See, e.g., Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among U.S.
Adults, 1999-2008, 303 JAMA 235 (2010).
131. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK CO. FOUND., supra
note 116, at 5. But see Uwe Reinhardt, Does the Aging of the Population Really Drive the
Demand for Medical Care?, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 27, 34-35 (2003) (noting that in the United
States, the age distribution does not explain all of the increase in health care costs). A
larger population necessarily incurs more costs, but should also produce a larger GDP.
ROBERT J. BARRO, HEALTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996), available at www.paho.org/
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132
cal technology and services, and the increased incidence of
chronic disease.133
It is possible that the costs of chronic diseases have increased in
part because more people have been diagnosed with a disease than
in the past, when some individuals might not have recognized a
problem—hypertension or metabolic syndrome, for example—as
warranting medical attention. H. Gilbert Welch and colleagues
argue that the medical paradigm has shifted from one in which
patients see physicians when they have symptoms to one in which
everyone is encouraged to be screened for many possible conditions when they have no symptoms of disease.134 Increasingly, sophisticated diagnostic technologies enable physicians to find
smaller and smaller abnormalities, which may or may not develop
into symptomatic diseases.135 This increased screening can increase the number of conditions found without necessarily changing the resulting health outcomes in the long-term.136 Increased
screening for disease has the advantage of identifying some problems at an early enough stage to permit curative treatment,137 but
screening itself has costs, including the costs of the screening
tests, unnecessary treatment for false positives, and sometimes
adverse reactions and complications from unnecessary treatment.138 The controversies over mammograms and PSA testing
are recent examples of the complexity of determining the value of
screening for diseases.139 Correctly diagnosing diseases brings

ENGLISH/HDP/HDD/barro.pdf (finding that a 5-year increase in life expectancy could
result in a 0.3-0.5% increase in GDP growth rate).
132. SHEILA D. SMITH ET AL., THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON HEALTH CARE
COST SPENDING: AN EVALUATION OF THE LITERATURE (2000), available at http://www.
cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tech_2000_0810.pdf. See Melinda J. Beeuwkes Buntin et al., Increased Medicare Expenditures for Physicians’ Services: What Are the
Causes?, 41 INQUIRY 83 (2004) (noting that new technologies have contributed to rising
costs).
133. See, e.g., Flegal et al., supra note 130; Hoffman et al., supra note 7.
134. H. GILBERT WELCH ET AL., OVERDIAGNOSED: MAKING PEOPLE SICK IN THE PURSUIT
OF HEALTH xii (2011).
135. Id. at 35
136. Id. at 44.
137. For example, treatment of hypertension can prevent or delay heart disease. K.L.
Ong et al., Prevalence, Awareness, Treatment, and Control of Hypertension among United
States Adults 1999-2004, 49 H YPERTENSION 69, 73-74 (2007).
138. WELCH ET AL., supra note 134, at 168-171.
139. Id. at x-xi; Gina Kolata, Mammogram Debate Took Group by Surprise, N.Y. T IMES,
Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/health/20prevent.html?_r=1&emc=eta1;
Allan S. Brett & Richard J. Ablin, Prostate-Cancer Screening—What the U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force Left Out, 365 N EW ENG. J. MED. 1949 (2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1112191.
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more patients into treatment, and treatment modalities are often
more intensive and expensive than those used several decades
140
Thus, improved screening and treatment brings a mix of
ago.
personal benefits and additional costs.
Successful preventive or treatment measures are valuable, because they enable people to live longer, healthier lives.141 That
should be sufficient reason to encourage their use. Yet, the justification for prevention routinely includes the assumption that prevention saves money.142 Some preventive measures, especially
immunizations and adults taking low-dose aspirin, appear to save
money.143 Estimates of the costs of chronic diseases that are attributed to specific risk factors, such as smoking and obesity, can
be misunderstood to mean that the amount of those costs could be
saved if those risk factors were eliminated.144 That assumes that
people without those risk factors would not incur costs for other
diseases, whereas almost everyone will incur some health care
costs, if only at the end of life. If we are lucky, those costs will be
less for healthy people than for those with chronic illnesses.
We might not be lucky. Most studies finding that health care
costs are higher for those with chronic diseases do not account for
lifetime costs of care.145 The longer people live, the longer they will
140. Charles S. Roehrig & David M. Rousseau, The Growth in Cost Per Case Explains
Far More of US Health Spending Increases Than Rising Disease Prevalence, 30 HEALTH
AFFS. 167, 169 (2011) (“increases in treated prevalence account for about one-fourth of
overall growth in real per capita spending, with the remainder attributable to growth in
cost per case”); Kenneth E. Thorpe & David H. Howard, The Rise in Spending Among Medicare Beneficiaries: The Role of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Changes in Treatment Intensity, 25 HEALTH AFFS. w378 (2006) (estimating that about half of the increase in per
capita spending for Medicare beneficiaries was attributable to increases in per capita
spending, with about half due to population aging).
141. For example, most pediatric immunizations prevent deaths from infectious diseases. Ctrs for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ten
Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001-2010, 60 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 619, 619 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm.
142. See, e.g., Jeffrey Levi et al., Healthier Americans for a Healthier Economy, HEALTHY
AMERICANS ISSUE BRIEF (TRUST FOR AM.’S HEALTH, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2011, at 1,
available at http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/TFAH2011PreventEconomy05.pdf;
P’ SHIP FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 113.
143. Sarah Goodell et al., Cost Savings and Cost-effectiveness of Clinical Preventive Care,
THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., Princeton, N.J.), Sept. 2009, at
1, available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/092209.policysynthesis.preventivecare.
brief.pdf.
144. See HEALTHMEDIA SOLUTIONS, supra note 122.
145. See, e.g., Nicolaas P. Pronk et al., Relationship Between Modifiable Health Risks
and Short-term Health Care Charges, 282 JAMA 2235, 2235 (1999) (finding that those who
were physically active, did not smoke, and were not overweight had almost half (49%) the
health care costs attributable to non-healthy adults over age forty).
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continue to get medical care. Thus, the total lifetime costs of care
for healthy, elderly people are similar to the costs for more seri146
ously ill people who die at a younger age. There is even evidence
that healthy people incur more lifetime health care costs than
people who are obese or who use tobacco, because healthy people
live longer.147 Indeed, the general consensus of economists and
actuaries is that few preventive measures can reduce lifetime
costs of health care.148 In 2009, before the ACA was enacted, the
director of the Congressional Budget Office, Douglas W. Elmendorf, concluded that “[a]lthough different types of preventive care
have different effects on spending, the evidence suggests that for
most preventive services, expanded utilization leads to higher, not
lower, medical spending overall.”149
Assumptions about the costs of chronic diseases also depend upon who is paying. The federal government’s budget must include
the costs of Social Security, Medicare, and the Department of Veterans Affairs, as well as increased Medicaid expenditures for a
newly expanded eligible population, so it must plan for the future
population of elderly and disabled.150 Medicaid and the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program covered forty-five million
146. See, e.g., James Lubitz et al., Health, Life Expectancy, and Health Care Spending
Among the Elderly, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1048 (2003) (finding that Medicare beneficiaries’
health status has little or no effect on total Medicare costs).
147. Pieter H.M. van Baal et al., Lifetime Medical Costs of Obesity: Prevention No Cure
for Increasing Health Expenditure, 5 PLOS MED. 0242, 0242 (2008); Kenneth E. Warner,
The Economics of Tobacco: Myths and Realities, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 78, 81 (2000). See
also June Stevens et al., The Effect of Age on the Association Between Body-Mass Index and
Mortality, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (1998) (finding that treatment costs were lower for
smokers than for the obese).
148. COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 10 (Marthe R. Gold et al. eds.,
1996); Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and the
Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 (2008); Matthew G. Marin & Jessica
Nutik Zitter, Expenditures Associated with Preventive Healthcare, 39 PREVENTIVE MED. 856
(2004); Louise B. Russell, Preventing Chronic Disease: An Important Investment, but Don’t
Count on Cost Savings, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 42, 42 (2009). See also Patrick McGeehan, U.S.
Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/ban-on-using-food-stamps-to-buy-sodarejected-by-usda.html (noting that the United States Department of Agriculture concluded
that prohibiting the use of food stamps to buy soda, as requested by New York City Mayor
Bloomberg, would not necessarily reduce obesity or improve health).
149. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nathan Deal,
Ranking Member of the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the
U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 7, 2009) (on file with the Cong. Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/104xx/doc10492/08-07-Prevention.pdf.
150. See Nicole Huberfield, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. P A . J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
2011) (describing the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid); Gina Livermore et al., Health Care
Costs Are a Key Driver of Growth in Federal and State Assistance to Working-Age People
with Disabilities, 30 H EALTH AFFS. 1664, 1664 (2011).
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151
However,
people (16.9% of the nonelderly population) in 2010.
employers are primarily concerned with their workforce before
retirement.152 Preventive measures may indeed delay some serious illnesses and expensive medical care until the population is
elderly.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid are well aware of the
need to control the costs of caring for their growing populations.
In 2005, Medicare began pilot testing its Health Support Program,
in which eight care management companies received $2,000 per
patient to improve health behaviors and outcomes in Medicare
beneficiaries with heart disease or diabetes.153 The companies
were expected to save their fees, plus 5% of patient costs.154 However, the program was stopped after three years, when Medicare
costs per patient increased by 5% to 11%, and most companies
were unable to save even their own fees.155 Recent research suggests that highly intensive and tightly coordinated care for patients who are elderly or have chronic diseases can improve both
the quality of care and patient outcomes.156 Whether they can save
money remains to be seen.

B.

Employee Wellness Programs

Most polls show that employers remain worried about rising
health insurance costs and continue to try to contain costs by rais151. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:
Analysis of the March 2011 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Emp. Benefit
Research
Inst.,
Washington,
D.C.),
Sept.
2011,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2011_No362_Uninsured1.pdf (reporting that
public health benefit programs, including Medicare, which covers certain disabled nonelderly, covered 21.6% of the total nonelderly population).
152. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS., INC., 2011 RCS
FACT SHEET #5: CHANGING EXPECTATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT 4 (2011), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2011/FS5_RCS11_Expects_FINAL1.pdf (noting that a
declining proportion of employers offer health benefits).
153. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ccip/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2011) (noting that 14% of Medicare beneficiaries have heart disease, but account for 43% of spending, and that 18% have
diabetes and account for 32% of spending).
154. NANCY MCCALL ET AL., EVALUATION OF PHASE I OF THE MEDICARE HEALTH SUPPORT
PILOT PROGRAM UNDER TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE: 18-MONTH INTERIM
ANALYSIS, REPORT TO CONGRESS, 6, 14 (2008), https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/
MHS_Second_Report_to_Congress_October_2008.pdf. The 5% savings requirement was
removed in 2007. Id. at 69.
155. Id. at 77-78.
156. See Chad Boult et al., The Effect of Guided Care Teams on the Use of Health Services: Results from a Cluster-Randomized Controlled Trial, 171 ARCH INTERN MED. 460
(2011).
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ing deductibles, increasing paycheck contributions, and moving
157
Disease management or
employees to lower-cost health plans.
wellness programs are an increasingly popular addition to employer cost control methods.158 Indeed, there is an entire industry
devoted to designing and administering such programs, either as
part of a health insurance plan or as a separate program.159 Safeway became the poster child for using wellness programs to save
health insurance costs.160 The ACA amendment to the HIPAA
provision governing wellness programs, discussed above, was
commonly called the Safeway Amendment.161 However, Safeway’s
cost controls were not necessarily attributable to its Healthy
Measures wellness program, which enrolled less than 9% of its
employees.162 Safeway’s savings occurred following a 2006 plan
change that increased the employee’s share of premium costs from
20% to 55%.163
A majority of large employers appear to welcome wellness programs.164 Small employers are less likely to offer wellness pro157. Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform,
9 YALE J. H EALTH P OL’ Y L. & ETHICS 453, 457-59. (2009). See also Deborah Brunswick,
Health Insurance Costs to Rise Again Next Year, CNN MONEY, Sept. 22, 2011,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/22/pf/health_insurance_costs/ (noting that premiums are
expected to rise 5.4%, which is less than recent increases, but still more than the 3.9%
general inflation rate/consumer price index); ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ,
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-MARCH 2011 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201109.pdf. Employers’ growing use of high-deductible, consumer-directed health plans may or may not affect employees’ use of preventive care. John
W. Rowe et al., The Effect of Consumer-Directed Health Plans on the Use of Preventive and
Chronic Illness Services, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 113 (2008).
158. Seff v. Broward Cnty, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“It is the economic loss suffered by employers that spurs the development of these programs, not some
beneficent wish for its employees to be healthy.”).
159. See generally CARE CONTINUUM ALLIANCE, http://www.carecontinuum.org/index.asp
(formerly named the Disease Management Association of America).
160. Steven A. Burd, How Safeway is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J., June 12,
2009, at A15. See JOHN E. MC DONOUGH , INSIDE N ATIONAL H EALTH R EFORM 192 (2011)
(reporting that Safeway’s president, Steven Burd, “convinced Democrat and Republican
members alike that he had found a personal-responsibility path to controlling health care
costs”).
161. David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2010, at G01.
162. Id. See MC DONOUGH , supra note 160, at 193 (Congressional Budget Office staff
concluded that “Safeway is largely a myth”).
163. Id.
164. Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 N EW ENG. J. MED. 192, 192 (2008); NAT’L BUS. GRP.
ON HEALTH & TOWERS WATSON, THE ROAD AHEAD: SHAPING HEALTH CARE STRATEGY IN A
POST-REFORM ENVIRONMENT 15 (2011), http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3946/
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grams, perhaps because they cannot afford the initial investment
required to purchase a gym or the services of an independent dis165
Employers promote such programs
ease management company.
as evidence of their concern for the health of their employees;
however, many employers focus primarily on the hope that wellness programs can reduce the costs of health insurance, decrease
absenteeism, and improve employee productivity.166 Indeed, most
disease management companies market their programs to employers by promising positive returns on the investment. Whether employers can reap the financial rewards of a successful wellness program depends upon how long it takes for a change in behavior to improve health, reduce costs, and decrease employee
turnover. Changes that produce relatively immediate effects, such
as feeling better after smoking cessation, can improve productivity
within a relatively short time. However, programs that target
risks for chronic diseases, such as blood sugar levels and obesity,
may not have significant effects for many years. In this era of frequent job changes, an employer may invest a great deal in employees who save money for a future employer. Moreover, since
the majority of healthcare costs are attributable to chronic diseases among the elderly and in the last year of life, it will be Medicare, not the employer, who is most likely to save healthcare costs.
However, a healthy employee who lives a very long life and receives Social Security benefits may cost the federal government
more in pensions than it saves in Medicare costs.167
Employers appear to be more enthusiastic about health promotion than employees. Some employees may welcome wellness programs and workplace incentives as a source of motivation, especially one that does not involve nagging family members.168 Others
may support wellness programs for fear that rising health care
TowersWatson-NBGH-2011-NA-2010-18560.pdf; KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH
RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY
168 (2011), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2011/8225.pdf. Small employers also are less
likely than large employers to offer health plans. Id. at 34.
165. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 2.
166. Id. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra
note 164 (reporting that the majority of employers surveyed who offer wellness programs
said their goal is “to improve the health of employees and reduce absenteeism”). At the
same time, 26% of all employers surveyed identified disease management as a “very effective” strategy to control costs. Id. at 194.
167. Timothy Westmoreland, Can We Get There from Here? Universal Health Insurance
and the Congressional Budget Process, 96 GEO. L.J. 523, 529 (2008).
168. See RICHARD H. T HALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, N UDGE : IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT H EALTH , W EALTH , AND H APPINESS (2008).
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costs attributable to unhealthy employees may reduce overall
compensation. Some employees, however, may find the programs
intrusive or fear losing their job if they fail to meet expectations.
A Wellpoint report states that almost 75% of employers offered
their employees a wellness program in 2008.169 But not all em170
ployees, typically less than half, accepted the offer. One study of
a reasonably successful employer program found that, of those
employees identified as at risk or eligible for a wellness program,
78% were successfully contacted by telephone.171 Of those contacted, 48% agreed to participate in the program, but less than
half (45%) of those who began the program stayed for at least six
months—17% of the original target population.172 IncentOne, a
company that sells health promotion and disease management
programs to health insurers and employers, claims that participation rates may be only 10-15% when incentives are not offered.173
Its website advocates using incentives to get employees into programs, stating that “84% of CEOs see incentives as [the] most important tool.”174
Incentives may indeed make a difference, both in participation
rates and outcomes, at least in the short run.175 Economists and
psychologists have long argued that people respond to financial
incentives.176 New York City is among several jurisdictions that
169. Helping People Help Themselves: Driving Participation in Health Improvement
Programs, INST. OF HEALTH CARE KNOWLEDGE—RESEARCH SUMMARY (WELLPOINT INST. OF
HEALTH CARE KNOWLEDGE), Aug. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.wellpoint.com/
prodcontrib/groups/wellpoint/@wp_news_research/documents/wlp_assets/pw_d014924.pdf.
170. Id. at 2.
171. Wendy D. Lynch et al., Documenting Participation in an Employer-Sponsored Disease Management Program: Selection, Exclusion, Attrition, and Active Engagement as
Possible Metrics, 48 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 447, 450 (2006). The number of employees deemed to be at risk was not specified. Id.
172. Id. at 452.
173. The Science of Health Incentives, INCENTONE (Nov. 2009), http://www.incentone.
com/index.php?option=com_smartformer&Itemid=173.
174. The Value of Health Incentives, INCENTONE, http://www.incentone.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72&Itemid=74 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
175. See Kate Cahill & Rafael Perera, Competitions and Incentives for Smoking Cessation, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (Cochrane Collaboration, London,
England), Apr. 13, 2011, at 1, 2; Leslie K. John et al., Financial Incentives for Extended
Weight Loss: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 621, 625 (2011);
Kim Sutherland et al., Impact of Targeted Financial Incentives on Personal Health Behavior: A Review of the Literature, 65 MED. CARE RESEARCH & REV . 36S, 38S-39S (2008).
176. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Asymmetric Paternalism to Improve Health
Behaviors, 298 JAMA 1425 (2007) (encouraging use of incentives to encourage people to
engage in beneficial behaviors, while acknowledging that this will be controversial); John
Cawley & Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors 100-103 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17081, 2011).
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177
have paid people to get medical examinations or tests. A reward
of $750 increased smoking cessation for a year in one randomized,
controlled trial.178 Florida introduced a program to reward Medicaid recipients for engaging in certain healthy behaviors with
vouchers to purchase medical products not covered by Medicaid at
retail pharmacies, but participation in the program is still low.179
In contrast, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s proposal to charge a
fifty dollar fee to Medicaid beneficiaries, including those who
smoke or are obese, provoked controversy, perhaps because it did
not offer beneficiaries any new assistance or other benefit in return for the fee.180
Simply providing insurance coverage for additional benefits can
operate as an incentive to get preventive care, by removing the
need to pay out of pocket. This is undoubtedly the motivation
behind state and ACA requirements for insurers to cover preventive services. It is also consistent with research findings that an
important reason that people fail to seek medical care is the cost
of that care.181 Medicare Part D appears to have increased recom182
mended prescription drug use among Medicare beneficiaries.
Cost-sharing, such as high co-payments or deductibles, can dis-

177. JAMES RICCIO ET AL., TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY ACROSS GENERATIONS: EARLY
FINDINGS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM iii (2010), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/549/full.pdf. Mexico has tried similar programs.
Id. at xv.
178. Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for
Smoking Cessation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 699, 708 (2009).
179. GREENE, supra note 90, at 8-9.
180. Janet Adamy, Arizona Proposes Medicaid Fat Fee, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576235151262336300.html
(noting that 25.5% of Arizona residents were obese and that its Medicaid program needed
additional revenue).
181. See Lisa Dubay et al., The Uninsured and the Affordability of Health Insurance
Coverage, 26 H EALTH AFFS. w22, w23 (2007); MAMANTHA PANCHOLI, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY: STATISTICAL BRIEF #32:
REASONS FOR LACKING A USUAL SOURCE OF CARE: 2001 ESTIMATES FOR THE U.S. CIVILIAN
NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION (2004), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/
mepsweb/data_files/publications/st32/stat32.pdf; ROBIN M. WEINICK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY: RESEARCH FINDINGS #3:
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE—SOURCES AND BARRIERS, 1996 4 (1997), available at
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/rf3/rf3.shtml. See generally SUSAN
S. SERED & RUSHIKA F ERNANDOPULLE, U NINSURED IN AMERICA: L IFE AND DEATH IN
THE L AND OF O PPORTUNITY (2005).
182. See James J. Kennedy et al., Cost-Related Nonadherence in the Medicare Program:
The Impact of Part D, 49 MED. CARE 522, 522 (2011). Prescription drug coverage was added to the Medical program as Part D of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, effective in
2006. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1860D-1 to 1860D-31 (2006).
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183
A
courage even those with health insurance from getting care.
recent study of the addition of co-payments for cancer drugs for
Georgia’s Medicaid beneficiaries found that the Georgians reduced
their acquisition of prescription drugs, compared with two states
that did not impose co-payments.184 Emergency room visits for
185
Georgia Medicaid patients also increased. After six months, the
Georgia Medicaid population cost $2,000 more per patient than
those in the other two states.186
Eliminating cost-sharing for preventive services, as the ACA
does, also has increased the use of preventive care.187 People with
chronic diseases are more likely to delay or avoid care when their
insurance requires point-of-service costs like deductibles and copays.188 This strongly suggests that eliminating cost-sharing is
likely to encourage people to obtain preventive services and improve health. However, increasing cost-sharing or denying discounts to people who do not successfully participate in wellness
programs may discourage people from getting services that would
benefit them.
Incentives that go beyond removing cost obstacles, like Arizona’s Medicaid proposal, may face resistance. West Virginia’s
Medicaid program received a waiver to offer an Enhanced Benefit

183. See generally Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM . ECON. REV . 251 (1987).
184. Sujha Subramanian, Impact of Medicaid Copayments on Patients with Cancer:
Lessons for Medicaid Expansion Under Health Reform, 49 MED. CARE 842, 843-45 (2011).
After co-payments were imposed, Georgians reduced their supplies of prescription drugs by
127 days compared to Texas and by 150 days compared to South Carolina. Id. at 844.
185. Id. at 844.
186. Id.
187. See Michael E. Chernew et al., Impact of Decreasing Copayments on Medication
Adherence Within a Disease Management Environment, 27 H EALTH AFFS. 103, 111 (2008)
(reducing copayments for prescription drugs increased medication adherence by several
percentage points); Niteesh K. Choudry et al., Should Patients Receive Secondary Prevention Medications for Free After a Myocardial Infarction? An Economic Analysis, 26 H EALTH
AFFS. 186, 186 (2007) (finding cost savings and decreased mortality); Teresa B. Gibson,
Ronald J. Ozminkowski & Ron Z. Goetzel, The Effects of Prescription Drug Cost Sharing: A
Review of the Evidence, 11 AM . J. MANAGED CARE 730, 737 (2005); Dana P. Goldman et al.,
Prescription Drug Cost Sharing: Associations with Medication and Medical Utilization and
Spending and Health, 298 JAMA 61, 61, 66 (2007).
188. See Goldman et al., id. at 65; John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and
the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH . J.L. REFORM 531, 566-67 (2005); Paul Fronstin & Sara R.
Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumerism in Health Survey,
2006: Early Experience with High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Plans, EBRI ISSUE
BRIEF (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 1, 33, available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2006/Dec/The
%202nd%20Annual%20EBRI%20Commonwealth%20Fund%20Consumerism%20in%20Hea
lth%20Care%20Survey%20%202006%20%20Early%20Experience%20With/IB%20Dec06%2
0Final%20E%20CF%20Logos%20pdf.pdf.
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Plan to beneficiaries who agree to certain responsibilities, including doing their best to stay healthy and attending health im189
provement programs as directed by their health providers.
Those who do not comply with the Enhanced Benefit Plan requirements and those who do not opt into the Enhanced Benefit
Plan are kept in the Basic Benefits Plan, which has many fewer
benefits.190 In particular, Basic Benefits do not include diabetes
care, weight management, nutrition education, smoking cessation,
or substance abuse and mental health services—the very services
that might mitigate the costs of chronic illness among the beneficiaries.191 The program raised concerns among physicians, who
were expected to monitor and perhaps enforce plan requirements.192 One evaluation found that only 10 to 15% of Medicaid
beneficiaries chose to participate in the Enhanced Benefit Plan in
its first year, even though no enforcement procedures had been
implemented.193
C.

Evidence for Health Improvement

Wellness programs generally are expected to improve health
and save money. The evidence for both is less than one would
hope, but there is somewhat more good news for health improvement than for saving money.194 There is a burgeoning literature
on the effects of wellness programs, although most concede several
limitations.195 First, many studies were conducted in single workplaces with a relatively small sample size, making it difficult to
determine whether the population is representative of all workers.
In some cases, only a small proportion of employees participated.
189. See W. VA. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES., WEST VIRGINIA MEDICAID MEMBER
AGREEMENT (DRAFT) (2005), available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/medred/handouts/wvmedicaidmemberagrmnt.pdf.
190. See W. VA. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES., CHAPTER 527: COVERED SERVICES,
LIMITATIONS, AND EXCLUSIONS FOR MOUNTAIN HEALTH CHOICES (2009), available at
http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/bms/Documents/bms_manuals_Chapter_527MountainHealthChoic
es.pdf.
191. Id. at 23.
192. See Gene Bishop & Amy C. Brodkey, Personal Responsibility and Physician Responsibility—West Virginia’s Medicaid Plan, 355 N EW ENG. J. MED. 756, 756-758 (2006).
193. MICHAEL HENDRYX ET AL., W. VA. UNIV. INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH,
EVALUATION OF MOUNTAIN HEALTH CHOICES: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available at http://www.hsc.wvu.edu/wvhealthpolicy/reports/
WV_paper_rev%20FINAL.pdf.
194. See Mark A. Rothstein & Heather L. Harrell, Health Risk Reduction Programs in
Employer-Sponsored Health Plans: Part I—Efficacy, 51 J. AM. C. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL.
MED. 943 (2009) (summarizing studies).
195. Id. at 945, 949; Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 6-7.
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Second, some programs, especially the most successful, were highly individualized and intensive, with repeated interactions with
employees, which may be difficult or expensive to translate else196
Third, some studies have no control groups against
where.
which to test the results in order to determine whether the program or external factors, such as growing public awareness of
health risks, caused any change. Fourth, few studies are randomized, controlled trials, and so are unable to reject the possibility—
some would say probability—that those who participate in wellness programs are more inclined to improve their health, even
without any formal program, than those who do not participate.197
Fifth, most reports review recently adopted, rather than mature,
programs, whose results may change over time, assuming they
remain in effect. Finally, few studies followed participants longer
than six months, so it is not known whether the participants continued their changed behavior after the program ended. Indeed,
literature reviews have concluded that behavior change is not necessarily sustained over time.198 Not often mentioned is the possibility that studies of successful programs, like studies showing
investigational drugs to be effective, are more likely to be published than studies showing little or no effect.199 Companies that
fund their own studies may have a say in whether or not the results are published.
Among the more successful wellness programs are smoking cessation programs; however, the proportion of smokers in a cessation program who quit, even for six months, seems surprisingly
low, ranging between 5 and 15%.200 The incidence of smoking in
the United States is now about 20%, having declined steadily for
several decades.201 Those who continue to smoke may have the
196.
197.
198.
199.

Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67.
Rothstein & Harrell, supra note 194, at 949.
See Cahill & Perera, supra note 175; Sutherland et al., supra note 175 at 74S.
See K. Dickerson et al., Publication Bias and Clinical Trials, 8 CONTROL CLINICAL
T RIALS 343, 351 (1987); Panayiotis A. Kyzas, Konstantinos T. Loizou & John P.A. Ioannidis, Selective Reporting Biases in Cancer Prognostication Factor Studies, 97 J. N AT’ L
CANCER INST. 1043, 1050 (2005); Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 256
(2008).
200. See TERRY F. PECHACEK ET. AL., U.S. DEP’ T OF H EALTH & H UMAN SERVS., BEST
P RACTICES FOR C OMPREHENSIVE T OBACCO CONTROL P ROGRAMS—2007 (2007), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/stateandcommunity/best_practices/pdfs/2007/BestPractices_
Complete.pdf.
201. AM. CANCER SOC’Y. CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2011 35 (2011), available at
http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@epidemiologysurveilance/documents/document/a
cspc-029771.pdf; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
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most difficulty quitting. Relapse is common, even after “successful” cessation programs; it can take many tries for a smoker to
202
Most experts recommend comprehensive toquit permanently.
bacco control programs that include taxation, public education
campaigns, and legal restrictions on sales and locations for smoking.203 Nonetheless, smoking cessation is a common wellness program goal, because the health benefits (apart from some weight
gain) are well established.204
Programs to reduce blood pressure (to lower or prevent hypertension and ultimately heart disease), and to a lesser extent cholesterol levels (to prevent heart disease), may be perhaps easier to
implement, partly because of the availability of reasonably effective pharmaceuticals.205 Programs that eliminate employee costsharing for prescription drugs have succeeded in improving adherence to drugs that can prevent heart attacks.206 Reducing risk
factors for diabetes, however, has proved to be more difficult. The
rising incidence of Type II diabetes has influenced the push for
preventive health care and wellness programs. High blood sugar
levels, along with high blood pressure and lipids, create risks for
Type II diabetes, which in turn, is a risk factor for heart disease,
stroke, kidney diseases, and other medical problems.207 Many programs focus on reducing blood sugar levels, but a careful, randomized, controlled trial found that the population receiving intensive
therapy to reduce its average blood sugar to normal levels (about 4
Servs., Current Cigarette Smoking Prevalence Among Working Adults—United States,
2004-2010, 60 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY W KLY. REP. 1305, 1305 (2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6038a2.htm.
202. See PECHACEK ET. AL., supra note 200.
203. See Kenneth Warner, Tobacco Policy Research: Insights and Contributions to Public Health Policy, in T OBACCO CONTROL P OLICY 3, 13-15 (Kenneth Warner ed., 2006);
PECHACEK ET. AL., supra note 200; Tobacco Use, GUIDE TO COMMUNITY P REVENTIVE
SERVS. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.thecommunityguide.org/tobacco/index.html.
204. See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE N AT’ L ACADS., ENDING THE T OBACCO
P ROBLEM : A BLUEPRINT FOR THE N ATION (Richard D. Bonnie et al. eds., 2007); U.S.
Surgeon Gen., U.S. DEP’ T OF HEALTH & H UMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004).
205. See Ara V. Chobanian et al., The Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on
Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure: The JNC 7 Report, 289 JAMA 2560 (2003). But see ACCORD Study Grp., Effects of Intensive BloodPressure Control in Type 2 Diabetes Mellitis, 362 N EW ENG. J. MED. 1575, 1584 (2010)
(finding that reducing blood pressure did not reduce the rate of fatal and nonfatal major
cardiovascular events).
206. See, e.g., Niteesh K. Choudry et al., At Pitney Bowes, Value-Based Insurance Design
Cut Copayment and Increased Drug Adherence, 29 H EALTH AFFS . 1995, 1997-1998 (2010).
207. See Thomas Almdal et al., The Independent Effect of Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus on
Ischemic Heart Disease, Stroke, and Death: A Population-Based Study of 13,000 Men and
Women with 20 Years of Follow-up, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL M ED. 1422 (2004).
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to 6%) experienced more deaths than the group receiving standard
therapy (2.6% v. 1.8%), which reduced its average level to about
208
7.5%. These results contradicted the standard recommendations
for diabetes control, and the researchers stopped the trial.209 On
the other hand, physical fitness may reduce the incidence of diabetes, even without weight loss.210
Significant weight loss appears to be the most difficult goal to
achieve and maintain.211 Short-term weight loss appears to be the
most common result.212 The average amount of weight lost in successful programs appears to be relatively small.213 Of course, averages hide individual differences; some participants may have
lost a great deal while others lost little or even gained weight.
The real problem appears to be maintaining weight loss.214 Participants often regain some or all of the weight they lose within a
year or so.215 There remains scientific uncertainty about the physiology of weight gain and loss. A recent study suggests that at
least some people may have hormonal or other biological resistance to weight loss—possibly a built-in survival mechanism that
served humanity well in prehistoric times of famine.216 Sustained

208. Action to Control Cardiovascular Risk in Diabetes Study Grp., Effects of Intensive
Glucose Lowering in Type 2 Diabetes, 358 N EW ENG. J. MED. 2545, 2545, 2550-51 (2008)
(explaining that both populations began with an average blood sugar level of 8.1% and that
comparative rates of death in the intensive versus standard therapy groups were 2.6%
versus 1.8% for cardiac deaths and 5% versus 4% for all causes of death).
209. Id. at 2546.
210. See Chobanian et al., supra note 205; Steven N. Blair & Tim S. Church, The Fitness, Obesity, and Health Equation: Is Physical Activity the Common Denominator? 292
JAMA 1232 (2004).
211. James W. Anderson et al., Long-Term Weight Loss Maintenance: A Meta-Analysis
of U.S. Studies, 74 AM . J. CLINICAL N UTRITION 579, 583 (2001).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Ron Z. Goetzel et al., Second-Year Results of an Obesity Prevention Program at The Dow Chemical Company, 52 J. Occupational Envtl. Med. 291, 294 (2010) (reporting that wellness program participants weighed 1.3 pounds less than non-participants,
primarily because non-participants gained an average of 1.3 pounds); Laurie M. Anderson
et al., The Effectiveness of Worksite Nutrition and Physical Activity Interventions for Controlling Employee Overweight and Obesity: A Systematic Review, 37 AM. J. PREVENTIVE
MED. 340, 350 (2009) (finding that studies of worksite programs achieved a pooled average
weight loss of 2.8 pounds per person over six to twelve months).
214. Rena R. Wing & James O. Hill, Successful Weight Loss Maintenance, 21 ANN. REV.
N UTRITION 323, 324, 336 (2001).
215. Id. at 325; Anderson et al., supra note 211, at 579; Leslie K. John et al., Financial
Incentives for Extended Weight Loss: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 26 J. GEN. INTERN.
MED. 621, 621 (2011); Melanie Warziski Turk et al., Randomized Clinical Trials of Weight
Loss Maintenance: A Review, 24 J. CARDIOVASCULAR N URSING 58, 59 (2009).
216. Priya Suminthran et al., Long Term Persistence of Hormonal Adaptions to Weight
Loss, 365 N EW ENG. J. MED. 1597, 1603 (2011). See also Paul S. MacLean et al., Biology’s
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weight loss appears to require life-style changes or many years of
intensive management, possibly including medication to regulate
217
Indeed, the limited success with
hormonal control of appetite.
most programs may encourage the use of bariatric surgery.218
The health effects of weight loss are also mixed. Repeatedly losing and regaining weight (yo-yo dieting) seems unhealthy. There
is even controversy about what constitutes a healthy weight.219
Most studies have concluded that the overweight population does
not have higher mortality rates than the normal weight population.220 Rather, increased risks of death, and especially increased
costs, primarily arise in the obese population, mostly concentrated
in the so-called morbidly obese (BMI 40).221 Compounding the
confusion, some popular discussions of obesity include the category of overweight (BMI 25 < 30) with that of obesity (BMI 30).222
In determining health effects and costs, however categorizing the
overweight with the obese is an error.
Nonetheless, the population weight curve has been shifting
slightly to the right in the past two decades, meaning that an increasing proportion of the population has moved from the normal
weight category to the overweight category, and from overweight
to obese.223 The question is whether that matters—for the population’s health or the nation’s economy. Some scholars argue that
adverse consequences of obesity are overblown.224 The association
between obesity and chronic diseases is well established, but the
Response to Dieting: The Impetus for Weight Regain, 301 AM . J. P HYSIOLOGY—
REGULATORY, INTEGRATIVE & COMP. P HYSIOLOGY R581 (2011).
217. See Thomas A. Wadden et al., Four-Year Weight Losses in the Look AHEAD Study:
Factors Associated with Long-Term Success, 19 OBESITY 1987 (2011) (Framingham study
reporting that women who lost weight gained more than those who did not).
218. See Joseph Proietto, Why Is Treating Obesity So Difficult? Justification for the Role
of Bariatric Surgery, 195 MED. J. AUSTL. 144 (2011).
219. See P AUL F. CAMPOS, T HE OBESITY MYTH 179 (2004).
220. John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An Instrumental Variables Approach 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16467,
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16467.
221. Id. at 39; Kevin R. Fontaine et al., Years of Life Lost Due to Obesity, 289 JAMA 187,
189 (2003). Obesity is classified into 3 grades, based on BMI: grade 1, BMI 30 35; grade 2,
BMI 35 40; and grade 3, BMI 40. Flegal et al., supra note 130, at 236.
222. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 10; Levi et al.,
supra note 142.
223. See Flegal et al., supra note 130, at 239; U.S. Obesity Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html (last updated July
21, 2011).
224. See MICHAEL GARD & JAN W RIGHT, T HE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: SCIENCE,
MORALITY AND IDEOLOGY 91-102 (2005) (analyzing the evidence); J. ERIC OLIVER, F AT
P OLITICS: T HE R EAL STORY B EHIND A MERICA' S OBESITY EPIDEMIC 23-27 (2006); P AUL
F. CAMPOS, T HE OBESITY MYTH 20-25 (2004).
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actual relationship is less well understood. Does obesity cause
chronic diseases or do chronic diseases lead to obesity? Is something else going on? Must the trend toward a larger population, so
to speak, mean that the country will experience increasing personal illness and financial costs?
D.

Evidence for Cost Savings

The literature abounds with reports of cost savings produced by
wellness programs.225 A recent meta-analysis of studies reported
that wellness programs cost employers an average of $144 per
employee per year and lowered annual medical costs by an average of $358 per employee per year, slightly lower than earlier reviews.226 Overall, the evidence that wellness programs save money
is more mixed.227 Several studies report increases in some costs
and decreases in others.228 Recent evidence suggests that cost savings may depend on very intensive programs and substantial incentives.229 Indeed, the most frequently cited examples of cost savings are from large employers that can afford to offer free services,
like on-site gyms, or more intensive, individualized care programs.230
Whether particular wellness programs save money also depends
on how costs are defined.231 Costs typically include health insurance premiums, but may or may not include the employee’s share
of the premium. If the employer considers only its own premium
contribution to be a cost, rather than the total premium, including
the employee’s contribution, the results may not reflect total costs.
225. An often-cited study is Steven G. Aldana, Financial Impact of Health Promotion
Programs: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 15 AM . J. H EALTH P ROMOTION 296
(2001). Aldana’s website states that he is the CEO and founder of WellSteps, a company
that sells wellness programs. Biography, STEPHEN G. ALDANA PH.D., http://www.
stevealdana.com/index_bio.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
226. Katherine Baicher et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29
HEALTH AFFS. 304, 304 (2010) (reporting an average return on investment of $3.27 for
medical costs per dollar spent and $2.73 per dollar spent for absenteeism).
227. See Rothstein & Harrell, supra note 194, at 948.
228. See, e.g., Todd Gilmer, Costs of Chronic Disease Management for Newly Insured
Adults, 49 MED. CARE e22-27 (2011) (reporting that annual inpatient costs were $1260
lower and outpatient costs were $723 greater, among participants in disease management).
229. See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 5.
230. See, e.g., Ron Z. Goetzel et al., The Long-Term Impact of Johnson & Johnson’s
Health & Wellness Program on Employee Health Risks, 44 J. OCCUPATIONAL E NVTL. M ED.
417 (2002); Rachel M. Henke et al., Recent Experience in Health Promotion at Johnson &
Johnson: Lower Health Spending, Strong Return on Investment, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 490
(2011).
231. See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67.
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The costs of absenteeism and productivity may or may not be included or calculated separately. In addition, to determine savings,
one must estimate what costs would have been without the program. That calculation may or may not take into account the effects of both internal and external changes that would have affected costs without the program. For example, if the employer
changed the benefit plan to reduce overall premiums by reducing
benefits, increasing deductibles or cost-sharing, or by increasing
the employee’s share of the premium, the employer’s own costs
would be reduced regardless of a wellness program. Similarly, the
employer may have improved the work environment or moved to a
different location that affects employee health or fitness.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF USING INSURANCE TO PROMOTE HEALTH
The ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs has one advantage and several disadvantages. The advantage is largely symbolic—it highlights the value of preventive measures to improve
health. Its disadvantages are both symbolic and practical. The
symbolism of health promotion is clouded by the emphasis on personal responsibility for health. This symbolism is likely to permeate public policy because it is embodied in insurance, which in
turn expresses powerful influences on social attitudes about collective versus personal responsibility. The ACA is structured to
establish a community with equal access to care by requiring uniform group premium rates, guaranteeing all legal residents health
coverage, and eliminating pre-existing condition exclusions and
caps on claims.232 This structure eliminates risk classifications
that distinguish one individual from any other in any risk pool.
Wellness programs that charge some individuals in the pool more
than others reintroduce the very risk classification that the ACA
rejected.233 Thus, the message of the ACA’s wellness provision is
that there is an exception to the ACA’s overall goal of ensuring
near-universal access to care at the same group rates, and that
exception is for people who fail to conform to an ideal of normal
health status.
The use of financial incentives to adjust the price of insurance to
individuals within a given risk pool can be viewed in quite different ways. On one hand, it can be seen as a new way for insurers
232. See Mariner, supra note 40 at 439. See also supra text accompanying notes 2, 55.
233. Mariner, supra note 12, at 222.
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to encourage their policyholders to take care of the insured property (the person’s body) so as not to cause abnormal wear and tear
or loss. An analogy might be requiring property owners to install
smoke detectors as a condition of homeowner’s insurance coverage. In this view, using preventive services like disease-screening
tests is analogous to installing smoke detectors, so that a person
can detect an incipient disease in time to prevent serious damage.
On the other hand, people are not property. Health risks are not
as easily detected as fires. Even when they are, the means to control or prevent future diseases are not necessarily under a person’s
control.
Financial incentives make sense to encourage rational decisions
among people who are in a position to respond voluntarily. However, physicians, not patients, make most decisions about medical
care.234 The “market” for medical care is unlike other consumer
product markets, because the consumer does not choose what
product to buy (except for certain elective services, such as cosmetic plastic surgery).235 Rather, the consumer typically decides
whether to accept or reject a physician’s recommendation for diagnostic, therapeutic, or rehabilitative care. Furthermore, medical recommendations are unlike a salesman’s recommendation
about which automobile or refrigerator or even insurance policy to
buy, because a patient may need medical care to survive in a way
that is entirely different from the need for a new car or refrigerator. As Deborah Stone points out, patients do not “use” health
care, in the sense that consumers “use” consumer goods.236 Patients tend to receive whatever their physicians recommend.
Therefore, attempts to reduce the demand for care would be better
redirected to the providers who create the demand.237 In this regard, increasing costs payable by patients, including increased
premiums, deductibles, and co-payments, appears both ineffective
234. See Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law and Medicine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002).
235. See id; Mariner, supra note 24.
236. Deborah Stone, Moral Hazard, 36 J. H EALTH P OL. P OL’ Y & L. 887, 894 (2011).
237. Examples of current efforts to encourage physicians to provide more cost-effective
care include proposed new payment methods, such as bundled or global payments and
accountable care organizations. See the CMS final regulations for accountable care organizations for the Medicare Shared Savings Program. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
425); Aricca D. Van Citters et al., Four Health Care Organizations' Efforts to Improve Patient Care and Reduce Costs, COMMONWEALTH FUND, Jan. 13, 2012, http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Case-Studies/2012/Jan/Four-Health-CareOrganizations.aspx.
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and unfair. Cost-sharing can discourage people from obtaining
238
medical care at exactly the time when they need care.
It may be objected that people do choose to “use” preventive
care, because preventive services, unlike most medical care, are
not recommended by physicians to treat an acute medical problem. It is true that patients can decide whether and when to get
preventive services. To this extent, financial incentives can influence the receipt of preventive care.239 Exactly what services to get,
however, remains essentially a medical determination.
It might also be objected that patients bear some responsibility
for their medical needs, to which physicians respond by recommending care. Indeed, this appears to be the sentiment underlying claims that unhealthy people are responsible for excessive
health care costs.240 There is no doubt that we can affect our own
health in many ways; we should listen to our grandmother’s advice on staying healthy. Nonetheless, the influences of our genes,
environment, income, and opportunities constrict our ability to
follow that advice to a greater or lesser extent.241
There are practical problems with locating wellness programs
within insurance. Their benefits and risks depend significantly on
how they are structured—whether and what kinds of incentives
they use. Programs that offer free services at the workplace have
few disadvantages, unless the employer monitors their use and
considers the information in retention and promotion decisions.242
Although incentives appear to improve results, they also invite
discrimination against those who are least able to afford higher
insurance costs.
Employer workplace wellness programs have the advantage of
being generally accessible to employees and can be administered
as part of the employer’s health benefit plans. However, these
advantages may be outweighed by practical concerns, especially
for private sector employers. With unemployment at more than
8% (not counting those who have given up looking for work), the
proportion of the nonelderly population with any prospect of em-

238. Stone, supra note 236, at 891.
239. See text accompanying supra notes 183-88.
240. See Abigail C. Saguy & Kevin W. Riley, Weighing Both Sides: Morality, Mortality,
and Framing the Contests over Obesity, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 879, 890-91 (2005).
241. See supra note 119.
242. See infra text accompanying notes 258-62.
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243
First, not all employer-sponsored health coverage is declining.
ployers offer health plans, much less wellness programs.244 High
employee turnover can dissuade an employer from offering health
benefits. If Congress eliminates the employers’ tax deduction for
contributions to benefit plans (and the exclusion from employee
income of the total contribution), there will be less reason for employers to offer a plan.245 Small employers in difficult economic
times are hard-pressed to provide benefits, even with the incentives provided by the ACA.246 Their employees will need to find
coverage in commercial plans offered through the health insurance exchanges or Medicaid. Insurers who offer plans through an
exchange may not offer wellness programs, especially if the required essential health benefits prove to be costly.247 Those insurers may have fewer incentives to include wellness program elements, because their covered population may be somewhat transient.
Second, employer plans do not necessarily cover all employees.
Many employers have temporary or part-time employees who need
not be offered benefits.248 In the current economy, employers may
rely on such part-time employees and be reluctant to offer them
special benefits. Temporary employees come and go and may
work for different employers, either simultaneously or one after
another. Employee turnover makes it difficult for both employees
and employers to reap the long-term benefits of wellness programs. This is exacerbated in businesses with a majority of low-

243. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT
SITUATION—JANUARY 2012 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/empsit.pdf. As of January 2012, the employment rate was 8.3%. Id.
244. Fronstin, supra note 151, at 5 (reporting that 58.7% of the nonelderly population
had employer-sponsored health benefits in 2010).
245. See Stephen Langel, ‘Super Committee’ Looks to Health for Savings to Reduce Deficits, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1819 (2011) (noting budget pressure to obtain an estimated $250
billion in tax losses).
246. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra note
164, at 34.
247. Health insurers offering plans through health insurance exchanges must cover
“essential health benefits” to qualify as acceptable plans. Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), The definition of essential
health benefits is quite broad and is to be based on a typical employer plan. Id. The Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is responsible for defining such benefits, has allowed the states to establish their own benchmarks for defining benefit. U.S. Dep’t
of Health and Human Servs., Essential Health Benefits: HHS Informational Bulletin,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/12/essential-health-benefits12162011a.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2012).
248. Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 503, 506 (1997).

File: 271 Mariner Article REVISED_R2.doc

314

Created on: 4/11/2012 11:17:00 AM

Duquesne Law Review

Last Printed: 4/11/2012 11:38:00 AM

Vol. 50

wage workers. Besides being hard-pressed to afford coverage, lowwage workers may change employers more frequently than highpaid employees. Changes in income may enable employees to
249
These shifts
qualify for Medicaid in one year, but not the next.
create inconsistencies in coverage and, presumably, participation
in wellness programs.
Third, not all eligible employees join their employer’s or union
plan.250 Some may get coverage from a spouse’s health plan, but
the most common reasons for not having health insurance are the
cost of the plan and beliefs that insurance is not necessary.251 The
price of insurance is unlikely to decline significantly after the ACA
becomes fully effective.252 Although the ACA provides incentives
for small businesses to offer health benefits, in the current economy, with diminished demand and the continued rise in health
care costs, insurance premiums may remain out of reach for many
small businesses.253
Finally, workplace programs won’t directly help family members, including children, unless the employee has family coverage
and the wellness program makes family members eligible to participate. Employers may require all participating members of the
family to meet wellness goals in order to earn rewards. Of course,
parents may apply what they learn in the workplace to their family members.
Public employers, especially state and local government employees, may have fewer of the above disadvantages, because their
employees are more likely to remain in government employment
249. See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 109.
250. See Jean M. Abraham & Roger Feldman, Taking Up or Turning Down: New Estimates of Household Demand for Employee-Sponsored Health Insurance, 47 INQUIRY 17
(2010); Fronstin, supra note 151, at 1 (finding that 51.5% of individuals with employerbased health benefits had coverage in their own names in 2010).
251. See Fronstin, supra note 151; CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME: INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf; Mark W. Stanton, Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance: Trends in Cost and Access, RESEARCH IN ACTION (Agency for Healthcare
Research & Quality, Rockville, Md.), SEPT. 2004, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
research/empspria/empspria.htm.
252. See Patricia F. Adams et al., Summary Health Statistics for the U.S. Population:
National Health Interview Survey, 2009, VITAL HEALTH STAT. (Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_248.pdf (finding that almost half the nonelderly population did
not have health insurance because of its cost).
253. See Edward A. Miller, Affordability of Health Insurance to Small Business: Implications of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 36 J. H EALTH P OL. P OL’ Y & L.
539 (2011).
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for longer periods of time. Many government employees are in
collective bargaining units, which may be able to negotiate the
254
wellness programs that employees seek. In contrast, state Medicaid beneficiaries are especially likely to have interrupted eligibility.255
In summary, it is probably overly optimistic to expect employer
programs to achieve the kind of results that would substantially
improve overall health or reduce the costs of chronic diseases.
Behavior change is difficult, especially when it is not selfmotivated.256 Medicare’s experience with disease management
257
programs shows how hard, and expensive, it can be.
A different disadvantage of placing wellness programs within
employer benefit plans is their potential for discrimination against
employees who are considered to be irresponsible about their
health. One possibility may be increased scrutiny by fellow workers, creating pressure to lose weight or stop smoking, for example.
Employees should be aware of the existence of wellness programs
and may observe and comment on the behavior of fellow employees and whether they have visible changes. The surveillance literature suggests that mechanisms for monitoring behavior can
produce conformity among the “watched.”258 Incorporating wellness programs into employee benefit programs may heighten
awareness of the differential costs for employees who do not meet
health standards. This can encourage the idea that individual
employees with specific conditions are raising the cost of health
insurance to the rest of the workforce.259 The fact that conditions
like obesity, but not sports injuries, for example, are singled out
254. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-12-0094, UNION
MEMBERS—2011 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
255. See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 109.
256. See Harald Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform—Problems with
Wellness Incentives, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. e3 (2009). See generally, M. J. Grawitch et al.,
The Path to a Healthy Workplace: A Critical Review Linking Healthy Workplace Practices,
Employee Well-being, and Organizational Improvements, 58 CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J.:
PRAC. & RES. 129 (2006).
257. Machlin et al., supra note 108, at 1. About 45% of people with public insurance
have at least 2 chronic conditions, compared with 1/3 of people with private insurance and
16% of uninsured persons. Id.
258. See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The New Politics of Surveillance
and Visibility, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 1, 22 (Kevin D.
Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2005).
259. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra
note 164, at 169 (reporting that 32% of large firms and 9% of small firms offering wellness
programs use insurance claims “to identify individuals and encourage wellness participation”).
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for attention, can create a distorted impression of the costs of medical care. Social pressures arising in the workplace may be severe.
Of greater significance is the possibility that employers will use
260
Peohealth status as a criterion for employment or promotion.
ple with chronic diseases can face barriers to employment, whether because of their actual or perceived lower productivity, disability costs, or simple prejudice.261 If insurance-based wellness programs encourage norms of personal responsibility for one’s own
health, as may be expected, existing prejudices may be more easily
justified on ostensibly objective grounds. Those who fail to manage their own health risks can be seen as out of control and outside the normal pool of responsible employees. Thus, defensible
prejudice can rationalize discriminatory hiring policies. 262
The law tends to support employers’ prerogatives to hire whomever they wish and on such terms as they choose. Employers can
change the terms of employment whenever they choose for employees who have no written contract.263 Only 11.9% of the U.S.
workforce (14.7 million people) was covered by a collective bargaining agreement in 2010.264 This suggests that most of the 240
million employees in the United States are employees at will.265 In
theory, the employee at will, like the employer, is free to leave for
260. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 128 (2011).
261. See OLIVER, supra note 224, at 61.
262. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1176
(1995) (distinguishing prejudice, which refers to feelings about others, such as pity, disgust,
or reverence, from discrimination, which means actions taken on the basis of prejudice,
such as avoidance or exclusion; also noting some disagreement on the boundaries between
the concepts).
263. Summers, supra note 248, at 504 (written contracts include individual contracts,
which are used primarily for executives, and collective bargaining agreements).
264. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-12-0094, UNION
MEMBERS—2011 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. This
represents a decline from 20% (17.7 million) in 1983. Id. Slightly less than half of these
(7.1 million) hold private sector jobs. Id.
265. Employment at will is a common law doctrine that presumes that any employee
without an individual or union contract may, at any time, quit the job or be terminated by
the employer for good cause, for no reason, or even for a morally wrong reason. Payne v. W.
& Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (Tenn. 1884). Employees who are hired without a definite term of employment are presumed to be employees at will. Pickell v. Ariz. Components
Co., 931 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Colo. 1997); Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386, 389
(Vt. 1996); Hatfield v. Health Mgmt. Assocs. of W. Va., Inc., 672 S.E.2d 395, 401 (W. Va.
2008); Garcia v. UniWyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 1996). See 5 J.D. LEE
& BARRY LINDAHL, Employment at-will doctrine, in MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 44.1 (2d ed. 2011) (collecting cases). For employment data, see BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 243.
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any reason or no reason, which allows a mobile workforce to take
266
advantage of new opportunities. In practice, however, especially
in economically hard times, the scarcity of alternative jobs gives
employees far less freedom to quit than the law presumes.267
Both legislation and common law doctrine have created exceptions to the employee at will doctrine, selectively limiting the employer’s freedom to hire and fire.268 Courts have construed employee handbooks and policies as constituting a contract that defines the terms and conditions of continued employment.269 It is
unlikely that the provisions of a voluntary wellness program in
the health benefits plan could be interpreted as a requirement.
However, if an employer were to require participation or the
achievement of specific health standards, these could be considered conditions of employment. Some courts have required termination only for cause where the employment circumstances created a reasonable expectation.270 In practice, such exceptions often
oblige employers to offer a reason for terminating an employee in
order to avoid a claim of wrongful discharge for a prohibited reason.271 These erosions of the employment at will doctrine create an
incentive for employers to track employee behavior to find a socially acceptable reason for termination if the employer wants or
needs to remove employees or jobs.272 Health insurance costs may
prove to be such a reason.
Statutory limits on employment decisions are better known and
also can be a foundation for claims of wrongful discharge against
public policy. The most important, Title VII of the Civil Rights
266. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT: COVERING THE
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES § 134 (1877).
267. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967).
268. Common law limitations, such as those based on public policy, typically are not
relevant to wellness programs and are not discussed here. See generally, Employment AtWill Exceptions by States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (April 2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13339.
269. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885
(Mich. 1980); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
Fewer than half of the states have implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment at will relationships, because the duty arose primarily when interpreting a contract. Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Md. 1991).
270. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985), modified on
reh’g, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
271. Paula G. Ardelean et al., The Development of Employment Rights and Responsibilities, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 451 (2010). According to the authors, this can discourage employers from taking a chance on new employees or firing unproductive employees.
Id. at 457.
272. See generally id.
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Act of 1964, prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis
273
The federal Age
of race, color, national origin, religion and sex.
274
Discrimination in Employment Act, the American’s with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),275 the Family and Medical Leave Act,276 and
the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (“GINA”)277 all
restrict employer decision making. However, such statutes typically do not apply to small businesses with fewer than fifteen or
twenty employees, and small businesses employ the majority of
American workers. 278
A recent federal district court decision underscored the employer’s remaining freedom to require employees to sacrifice family and perhaps health as a condition of advancement.279 Judge
Loretta A. Preska dismissed claims of gender discrimination
against Bloomberg L.P., finding that “[t]he law does not require
companies to ignore or stop valuing dedication, however unhealthy that may be for family life.”280 Her decision noted that
Bloomberg “explicitly makes all-out dedication its expectation,”281
but concluded that “the law does not mandate ‘work-life’ balance.”282 The decision emphasized that the employee, rather than
the employer, had a choice: “[a] female employee is free to choose
to dedicate herself to the company at any cost, and, so far as this
record suggests, she will rise in this organization accordingly.”283
The decision suggests that poor employment conditions are acceptable as long as they apply to everyone.
Adding wellness programs to employee compensation packages
may invite similar pressures. The relationship between insurance
underwriting and wellness programs is illustrated by a challenge
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is applicable to employers with at least fifteen employees. § 2000e.
274. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (applicable to employers with at least twenty employees).
275. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
276. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
277. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (applicable to employers with at least fifteen employees).
278. States have enacted similar laws, often covering additional protected classes. See
Ardelean, supra note 271, at 453.
279. Equal Employ’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bloomberg L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 485
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
280. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
281. Id. at 485.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 486. Apparently, the company treated all leaves of absence equally, so that
women who took maternity leave were no worse off than others who took leaves for other
reasons. Id. at 484.
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to a wellness program established by Broward County, Florida,
284
The County deducted twenty dollars
through its health insurer.
from the bi-weekly paycheck of each employee who did not complete a health risk assessment and biometric screening.285 The
insurer identified employees with asthma, hypertension, diabetes,
congestive heart failure, or kidney disease and offered them a disease management coaching program.286 Employees who participated in the coaching program could receive some medications
free.287 Bradley Seff, an employee who was charged the twenty
dollar fees, claimed that the program violated the ADA by requiring employees to submit themselves to medical examinations and
questioning.288 A federal district court in Florida dismissed the
claim, finding that the program was not discriminatory, because it
was a legitimate method of assessing risks in order to plan future
health insurance coverage.289 To do so, the court relied on the need
290
for risk classification in insurance coverage.
The court found that the wellness program was part of the
health insurance plan, which is quite correct.291 The ADA permits
insurers to conduct bona fide risk classification and underwriting.292 That provision was intended to allow premium differences
that are based on actuarial differences in claims costs.293 The
court considered that provision to be a safe harbor from the ADA’s
prohibition on medical inquiries and examinations.294 It concluded
that the program was based on “insurance and risk assessment
principles,” which were permitted by the ADA, and not on “some
284. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
285. Seff, 778 F. Supp 2d. at 1372.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. Under the ADA:
a covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries
of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to
the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown
to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2010).
289. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1373. The court also found that, alternatively, the wellness program by itself
could be considered to be a benefit plan, which would not change the analysis. Id. at 1373
n.5.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
293. Barnes v. Benham Grp., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (D. Minn. 1998).
294. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1375. The court agreed with plaintiff that the wellness
program was “not entirely optional,” since non-participants were charged a biweekly fee.
Id. at 1373. It is doubtful, but not impossible, that this conclusion was material to the
court’s decision. Others could just as easily conclude that the same program was voluntary.
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independent desire for a healthy workforce.” The insurer, therefore, could alter costs based on an employee’s health risks. Of
course, it was the employer, not the insurer, that charged the fee,
but the court noted that the employer was managing an employee
benefit plan and could make financial decisions based on risk classifications. This interpretation of the ADA would conflict with the
ACA and HIPAA’s prohibition on discrimination based on health
factors, were it not for the wellness program exception.296
GINA and the HIPAA Privacy Regulations may have the most
significant application to wellness programs, because many programs collect personal health information about individuals.297
One of the most common elements of employer wellness programs
is the Health Risk Assessment (HRA), which typically asks the
employee to identify whether she has any health risks from a list
and often includes biometric measures, such as blood tests.298
Completing an HRA is often the prerequisite to receiving wellness
program services, especially those intended to provide individualized advice or coaching.299 GINA prohibits both employer group
health plans and health insurers providing group coverage from
“adjust[ing] premium or contribution amounts for the group covered under such plan on the basis of genetic information.”300 If
employees volunteer genetic information that affects a wellness
program reward, the prohibition can come into play.301
A key difference between anti-discrimination laws and common
law doctrine is that the former creates protected classes defined
primarily (although not exclusively—religion is an exception) on
immutable traits of the employee, like race, age, and genetics,
while common law doctrine focuses on the employer’s reasons or
the employee’s actions, without regard to such inherent traits.302
Thus, employees who are not discriminated against on the basis of

295. Id. at 1375.
296. See infra text accompanying notes 56-81.
297. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 2-3.
298. Id.; KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra
note 164, at 169. See Anderson v. City of Taylor, No. 04-74345, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38075, at *12-18 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2006) (finding that a blood draw pursuant to a mandatory wellness program for city fire fighters could be challenged as a violation of the employees’ rights to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment).
299. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 2.
300. Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101(a), 102(a),
122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 (2008).
301. Bard, supra note 12.
302. See supra notes 268-71.
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such protected traits are not eligible for statutory remedies for
employment discrimination. However, apart from the ADA, being
at risk of a chronic disease is not a characteristic of a protected
class, and even the ADA would not protect people who are merely
at risk of future disease, unless the risk factor itself, such as hypertension, qualified as an impairment that affected a major life
activity or the employer perceived the person as having a disability.303
Some employers are already refusing to hire people who use tobacco, even if only outside the workplace.304 The reason most often
305
given is to promote the health of their employees. In some cases,
an employer’s aversion to smoking in the workplace has become
an aversion to smokers, even if the employees do not smoke at
work. Decades of public education about the risks of smoking has
made it socially acceptable to refuse employment to smokers.306
People who are obese or even overweight may experience similar
reactions. Prejudice against people who are obese is hardly a recent phenomenon.307 A New York court found that a prosecutor
was entitled to strike a juror on the grounds that she was overweight, because he believed that heavy-set people tend to be very
sympathetic toward any defendant.”308 Overweight children are
309
often the target of teasing and discrimination. A recent proposal
to characterize childhood obesity as grounds for charging parents
with child neglect breaks new ground by assuming that a child’s
303. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2010).
304. See, e.g., City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995), (upholding
refusal to hire smoker); Rodrigues v. EG Sys., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D. Mass.
2009). Ten years after Kurtz, the City of North Miami rescinded its ban when it could not
get enough applicants. Linda Florea, St. Cloud Hires Smokers Again, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
May 24, 2006, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2006-05-24/news/OWNOSMOKE24_
1_1_smoking-policy-cloud-tobacco. The World Health Organization was perhaps the most
prominent entity to adopt a policy of not hiring smokers. WHO Policy on Non-recruitment
of Smokers or Other Tobacco Users: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/employment/FAQs_smoking_English.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
305. Id.
306. Jennifer Stuber et al., Smoking and the Emergence of a Stigmatized Social Status,
67 SOC . SCI . & MED. 420 (2008).
307. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND
LAW (2010); SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FIGHTING WEIGHT-BASED
DISCRIMINATION (2000); Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”:
Weight-Based Discrimination and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 152 (2001).
308. People v. Dolphy, 685 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
309. Helen A. Hayden-Wade et al., Prevalence, Characteristics, and Correlates of Teasing
Experiences Among Overweight Children vs. Non-overweight Peers, 13 OBESITY RESEARCH
1381 (2005).
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310
So far, the
weight could be controlled by a responsible parent.
British Medical Association has rejected it, but the idea could resurface.311
In the past decade, however, several states have enacted legislation to protect employees from discrimination on the basis of employee behavior outside the workplace.312 While some states prohibit discrimination on the basis of tobacco use at home, other
states expand protection to any lawful conduct outside the workplace.313 Like earlier anti-discrimination laws, these statutes appear to be intended to eliminate adverse employment decisions
that are based on factors having nothing to do with job performance. So far, there have not been similar reactions to the kinds of
behavior changes encouraged by wellness programs, although critics point out that such policies not only create stigma, but also
deprive qualified people of employment.314
Monitoring employees for behaviors beyond job performance obviously raises privacy questions. Although the workplace is not a
privacy zone, employees have long expected that their lives outside the workplace are none of their employer’s business. That,
too, is changing. The ADA limits, but does not eliminate, affected
employers’ access to medical information about employees.315 Employers may require employees to take a medical examination or
employers may ask about medical conditions as long as these examinations are “job related and consistent with business necessity.”316 The targets of wellness programs are not generally related
to job performance. Nonetheless, the growing salience of health to
job performance may expand the sphere of permissible inquiries.
Moreover, to the extent that business necessity includes financial
constraints on the employer’s budget for labor, employees who are

310. Russell M. Viner et al., Childhood Protection and Obesity: Framework for Practice,
341 BRIT. MED. J. 3074 (2010).
311. Andrew Cole & Zosia Kmietowicz, BMA Rejects Call for Parents of Obese Children
to Be Charged with Neglect, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 1343 (2007).
312. John Malouff et al., US Laws That Protect Tobacco Users from Employment Discrimination, 2 TOBACCO CONTROL 132 (1993).
313. Id.
314. Brian Houle & Michael Siegel, Smoker-Free Workplace Policies: Developing a Model of Public Health Consequences of Workplace Policies Barring Employment to Smokers, 18
TOBACCO CONTROL 64 (2009); Leonard Glantz, Smoke Got in Their Eyes, WASH. POST, Dec.
18,
2005,
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/17/AR200
5121700945.html.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2010) (prohibiting medical inquiries and examinations
before an offer of employment). The Family Medical Leave Act limits employers’ access to
reasons for an employee’s medical leave. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.306(a)(2)-(3), 825.307(a) (2011).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
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believed to generate high health insurance or absentee expenses
may be subject to increasing monitoring or dismissal. Of course,
the ADA protects employees with a disability from termination
solely for reasons of cost, but the class protected, like those specified in other federal anti-discrimination laws, remains only a subset of all workers in the country. Moreover, it may not be difficult
for employers to avoid hiring individuals who appear obese or
have obvious personal characteristics that the employer believes
will lead to higher health costs.
Maintaining appropriate confidentiality of medical records can
be difficult when employees and their dependents are enrolled in
employer-sponsored health plans. Health insurers, like hospitals
and other care providers, are obligated to keep medical records
confidential and not disclose them without patient consent under
HIPAA.317 Thus, group health plans have an obligation not to dis318
But employers themclose claims information to an employer.
selves are not necessarily subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
which applies only to “covered entities” who keep medical records.319 Employers who establish self-insured health plans,
rather than buying a commercial insurance policy, are not deemed
to keep records or to be insurers or providers.320 The self-insured
plan is governed by a trust, which, in theory, is separate from the
employer.321 Nonetheless, it may be unrealistic to expect that an
employer, who may be the plan fiduciary as well as the boss, can
keep an impermeable wall between employee performance records
and its health plan or other employee medical records. Companies
may not receive individual data, but they do analyze aggregate
employee results. Smaller companies may be able to guess who is
and is not participating in a wellness program. Where incentives
are offered, the payroll department must issue checks or deduct
higher premiums for health insurance from the employee’s wages.
Employers have direct access to other records, such as long-term
disability and worker compensation claims. They also search social media, such as Facebook, and use background checks to glean

317. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102-06, 164.500-34 (2011).
318. Id. § 164.504(f)(2)(ii)(C).
319. Id. § 160.103.
320. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2010).
321. Id. § 1102 (2010) (establishment of plan and designation of fiduciary). Many employers engage a commercial insurer to act as a third party administrator to handle claims
and the collection of premiums and cost-sharing.
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Note,
information about prospective and current employees.
however, that employers must keep confidential certain records
that they are entitled to maintain pursuant to the ADA and the
FMLA.323
Still, employees may legitimately worry that medical information that might threaten their jobs could be easily accessed by employers, whether deliberately, through sloppy practices, or as a
result of genuine confusion about their obligations. Employers
who lawfully learn something about an employee’s medical condition are generally free to use it to make employment decisions,
unless otherwise limited by federal or state anti-discrimination
laws.
There is a certain irony to the notion that the ADA, which was
enacted to protect people with disabilities from being excluded
from or disadvantaged in employment, would be interpreted to
permit penalizing employees who are, at best, at risk for a disease
or disability. Discrimination on the basis of health factors may be
as irrational as discrimination on the basis of disability. Employers and insurers who ask applicants and employees about their
health risks for purposes of determining the amounts employees
pay for insurance are encouraged to impose differential costs on
those with risks. The ADA safe harbor was apparently intended
to permit insurers to charge actuarially fair rates, based on a
group’s claims experience. A Florida district court found that the
wellness program was “based on the theory that encouraging employees to get involved in their own healthcare leads to a more
healthy population that costs less to insure.”324 Other courts may
accept the same theory, especially since judges are not typically in
a position to critically analyze the data on prevention and may see
only the more enthusiastic summaries of advocates for preventive
care.
This posture may encourage financial discrimination
against employees who are believed to have medical conditions
that would raise insurance costs.

322. Ardelean, supra note 271, at 463-67 (noting that employers may also monitor employee computers and, with some exceptions, email at work). See LORI B. ANDREWS, I
KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID 122-23, 132 (2011).
323. The ADA requires employers who obtain medical information about an applicant to
keep it confidential in a separate medical file, available only to supervisors and managers
only as needed for work restrictions, accommodations, and emergency treatment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(3)(B) (2010). Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations now
prohibit discrimination against employees on the basis of genetic information their employers find on social networks. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8 (2010).
324. Seff v. Broward County, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
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By increasing the permissible amount of incentives for wellness
programs, the ACA encourages more financial incentives—cash
325
Inpayments, insurance premium discounts, and surcharges.
deed, it may encourage programs that require people to meet specific targets, such as losing a certain number of pounds, lowering
their blood sugar to a particular level, or stopping smoking. If
enough employees do not participate in voluntary programs or fail
to achieve health targets, will employers begin to require participation? Or might employers find reasons to avoid hiring such individuals?
Discriminatory employment practices, even if legal, are likely to
hurt the most disadvantaged among us. The target population for
wellness programs overlaps to a substantial degree with the population least able to afford health insurance.326 Chronic diseases,
obesity, and tobacco use are more prevalent in the lower socioeconomic classes than in the general population.327 About half of
those with disabilities who work earn poverty-level wages.328
While it might seem helpful to create financial incentives for them
to reduce their health risks, they may be in the weakest position
to do so. If these individuals do not succeed in qualifying for discounts or rewards, they will pay a larger share of their smaller
income to obtain the same health insurance available to everyone
else in the pool. In the worst case, they will not find employment
at all, yet income can be a better predictor of health than the
health factors that wellness programs seek to improve.
Employee programs that succeed in preventing illness may have
value to employers for two reasons. First, employers may save
money in the short-term if employees are more productive and less
prone to absenteeism. Second, some costs of medical care may be
shifted into the future, most probably after retirement, and onto
the federal government, which pays the costs of Medicare. Thus,
while employers may gain some benefits, the government is likely
to pay the costs. How should this factor into the analysis? There
is no risk spreading between the public and private sector, except
to the extent that employers and employees contribute Medicare
and Social Security taxes. To more fairly spread the risk between
325. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67.
326. See Jacobi, supra note 188.
327. See Kristin Voigt, Smoking and Social Justice, 3 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 91 (2010)
(noting that a disproportionate number of smokers are from disadvantaged populations).
328. Peiyun She & Gina A. Livermore, MATERIAL H ARDSHIP , P OVERTY, AND
DISABILITY AMONG W ORKING-A GE ADULTS (2006).
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employers and government, Medicare could be increased to compensate the government for the additional expenses it is likely to
incur as a result of the employer’s healthier employees. This kind
of risk spreading, of course, would surely be opposed by employers
(and probably employees, too), who seek to reduce their costs, not
increase their taxes. Yet, it would more fairly represent the responsibility for health care across the population’s lifetime.
VI. PREVENTION OUTSIDE INSURANCE
Situating the locus for health improvement at the level of the
individual sends a message that individuals are responsible for
their own health, regardless of the pressures and obstacles they
face. Whether this is true in any case depends upon the problem
being addressed. If the problem is that people don’t know their
risks or the benefits they could receive by changing their behavior,
then the solution is to let them know. Whose responsibility is
that? It seems unlikely that employers and insurers should be the
responsible party. If the problem is that they understand their
risk, but don’t change, whose problem is that? Is there a duty to
be healthy? If it is a problem that endangers society as whole,
such as irrational or violent behavior, government can justifiably
control the individual.329 Here, however, the problem appears to
be the cost of care. The cost of care is determined more by health
care providers than individuals. If the government wants to reduce costs, it would be more effective to regulate those who set the
fees, instead of spreading the costs back onto those who use the
services.
Behavior science literature demonstrates that it is especially
difficult to engage in anything that feels like a deprivation today if
the benefit is far in the future, as is the case with most wellness
programs.330 For those who want to change, but need a push, the
default system of paternalism may be welcome. If the problem is
the cost of care, however, we need better information about the
relative costs of different health risks. Moreover, it is difficult to
rely on individuals to change their health status, because the fac-

329. See Gard & Wright, supra note 224, at 181 (“Being defined as ‘overweight’ means
that a whole range of institutions . . . are provided with the right and indeed the responsibility to identify people so categorized, or people who might be ‘at risk’ of such categorizations, and to regulate their behaviors.”).
330. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168.
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tors that mediate health status are numerous and complex, in331
cluding social conditions that promote inequality.
To the extent that responsibility for health rests with private
insurance plans—private products—opportunities for improving
health focus on micro-relationships between employee and employer or enrollee and insurer. This excludes macro-level, structural social and economic influences on health, which can only be
significantly modified by government action. Such influences include the built environment, agricultural policy, and the changing
diet produced by global food distribution.332 Most observers recognize these macro influences, but changing them is a long, arduous
process. Thus, the focus remains on individual behavior, either as
the fallback position or as a symbolic effort. For example, after
constructing several estimates of chronic disease costs, the World
Economic Forum’s disappointing recommendations for “the ‘best
buy’ interventions” for prevention were fourteen standard recommendations for changing personal behavior, preventive medical
care, taxes, and education.333 This has significant implications for
social attitudes toward people who are not in good health. Using
insurance to attempt to modify their condition fosters the idea
that they are at fault and must either change or pay a penalty.
Social attitudes about personal responsibility for risk may permanently change social norms and make it even more difficult to
change the underlying environment. Finally, it may further marginalize the disadvantaged by segregating them into a new class of
the “unhealthy.”
Currently, opinion polls indicate that the public is ambivalent
about whether people with certain health risks should pay for insurance. Some polls show that a majority believe that people who
smoke or are overweight should pay higher insurance premiums
331. See supra note 118.
332. See, e.g., Mickey Chopra, Globalization and Food: Implications for the Promotion of
“Healthy” Diets, in GLOBALIZATION, DIETS & NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES (2002), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241590416.pdf; Corinna Hawkes, Uneven
Dietary Development: Linking the Policies and Processes of Globalization with the Nutrition
Transition, Obesity and Diet-related Chronic Diseases, 2 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (2006);
David Price, Allyson M. Pollock & Jean Shaoul, How the World Trade Organisation Is
Shaping Domestic Policies in Health Care, 354 LANCET 1889 (1999).
333. BLOOM ET AL., supra note 8, at 37. The recommendations were taxes on tobacco and
alcohol, smoke-free workplaces and public places, health information, bans on tobacco and
alcohol advertising and promotion, restricted access to alcohol, reduced salt intake, replacing trans fats, mass advertising on diet and physical activity, counseling and drug therapy
(including aspirin) for those at risk of cardiovascular disease, hepatitis B immunization,
and screening and treatment of precancerous lesions to prevent cervical cancer. Id.
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because they will generate more health care costs. Other polls
find that the majority believe that such a practice would be un334
fair. The more people become habituated to the idea that health
care costs are a matter of personal responsibility, the more likely
they are to accept differential pricing. And if differential pricing is
acceptable, then perhaps more coercive measures can also be accepted. The law’s protection of civil liberties makes clear that
people should not be forced to do things that have negligible social
benefit and certainly not solely for economic benefit. So, government can require people to get immunized against a severe, contagious disease in order to prevent an epidemic, but cannot require
people to take drugs as part of a research study that might benefit
mankind, just because it would be cheaper to do so without getting
their agreement. Similarly, government cannot force a person into
a housing project in order to save money, but can institutionalize a
person who is dangerous to others by reason of a mental illness
that makes it unlikely that he will be able to control his own violent behavior.
Wellness program incentive systems range from minor and
marginally effective, to major and possibly coercive. The ACA’s
wellness program exception represents an attempt to reconcile two
inconsistent goals: enabling penalties and rewards based on
health risks without deviating from the general principle that
health insurance should not be based on risk classifications. Although researchers are earnestly trying to find the combination of
services and incentives that produce the best results, all programs
(other than those providing free services and facilities) create insurance premiums based on an individual’s risk classification.
The use of incentives to participate does not necessarily make a
program voluntary, because rewards and penalties are two sides
of the same coin.335 In short, the incentives permitted for wellness
programs are likely to be too crude to significantly improve the
population’s health or save money, and they pose an unnecessary
threat to the underlying goals of the ACA. They do not belong in
an insurance system that avoids risk classification. Instead,
health insurance should cover all actual claims without adjust334. Drop in Public Support of Higher Healthcare Costs for Smokers, Obese, ETHICS
NEWSLINE (Inst. For Global Ethics, Rockport, Me.), Nov. 05, 2007, available at
http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/2007/11/05/drop-in-public-support-of-higherhealthcare-costs-for-smokers-obese/.
335. Mariner, supra notes 12; Erika Blacksher, Carrots and Sticks to Promote Healthy
Behaviors: A Policy Update, 38 H ASTINGS C TR . REP. 13 (2008).
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ments for risk factors that may or may not affect the claims rates.
A better approach would eliminate the wellness program exception and rely on publicly available preventive and social services
to promote health.
So, what is the best way to share responsibility for improving
the population’s health? The market economy distributes private
goods. Public goods are typically distributed or regulated by government. Public investments in health are generally believed to
improve economic conditions and vice versa.336 The most effective
ways to improve the population’s health are likely to lie in improving the social determinants of health. In principle, there is substantial support for public programs to provide preventive services, safer social and built environments, research, and education. As a result, a better question involves how government could
make it possible for people to improve their health. Publicly provided services have the advantage of being available to everyone,
regardless of employment or insurance status. Individuals can
avail themselves of the services without being subjected to intrusive monitoring by employers. This approach can encourage good
health without penalizing those who either cannot improve or do
not care to change. The services could extend to other chronic diseases of importance, like arthritis, Alzheimer’s disease, and depression.337 Indeed, they could and should be coordinated with
programs to increase employment and income and improve housing and education, which are likely to reduce health risks to a larger degree than insurance wellness programs.338 A community-

336. William Jack & Maureen Lewis, Health Investments and Economic Growth: Macroeconomic Evidence and Microeconomic Foundations (World Bank, Working Paper 4877,
2009).
337. Arthritis, back conditions, and heart disease accounted for 41% of disabilities in the
United States in 2005. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH AND WELLNESS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2005), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
library/disabilities/calltoaction/calltoaction.pdf. See also Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Epidemiology of Major Depressive Disorder: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication, 289 JAMA 3095 (2003) (noting that depression is a major cause of disability).
338. See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (2009);
Jens Ludwig et al., Neighborhoods, Obesity, and Diabetes—A Randomized Social Experiment, 365 N EW ENG. J. MED. 1509 (2011) (explaining how women and children randomly
assigned by HUD to receive vouchers to move to low-poverty housing areas slightly lowered
their rates of obesity and high blood sugar, compared with those who did not receive vouchers and could choose their own housing area); Communities Putting Prevention to Work:
CDC Awards $372.8 Million to 44 Communities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/chronicpreventiongrants/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2011).
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based or public health approach recognizes that promoting health
is a social responsibility to make a healthy life possible, rather
than an individual duty to stay healthy and save money.
Employers can still play a role. Those who offer free services,
such as on-site fitness centers, safe buildings, and perhaps quiet
rooms for napping or stress reduction exercises, as a benefit of
employment independent of health insurance, should be rewarded,
perhaps by tax deductions. Employers might be encouraged to
address issues beyond smoking and obesity, such as stress reduction, scheduling, and depression.339 But, by removing risk classification from employee insurance plans, the potential for discrimination against employees is reduced.
VII. CONCLUSION
The function of preventive care is to improve health, not necessarily to save money. This is a valuable goal in its own right. The
ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs, however, links health
promotion to cost savings in ways that may be both ineffective and
counterproductive. The ACA frames health as a personal responsibility, which is inconsistent with its overall goal of universal access to health care.340 It encourages the use of public and private
insurance to goad individuals to conform to behaviors that are believed to save money by preventing chronic diseases. It is far from
clear whether wellness programs can achieve those goals to any
significant degree, both because the programs are highly variable
in producing behavioral change and because substantial savings
are unlikely over the long run.
Skepticism about the value of wellness programs, however, is
not an indictment of the goal of improving heath or encouraging
the use of preventive services. It is, rather, a critique of the use of
insurance as the means to accomplish those goals. Insurance reflects what we find socially acceptable, which risks we are willing
to share, and which risks remain the responsibility of individuals.
Insurance also shapes public perceptions of risk. The United
States has a history of characterizing health as a personal respon-

339. See Walter F. Stewart et al., Cost of Lost Productive Work Time Among US Workers
with Depression, 289 JAMA 3135 (2003).
340. CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Teversky eds., 2000).
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The ACA can change that characterization by enabling
sibility.
everyone to have access to care without regard to why care is
needed. It can do so by eliminating risk classifications based on
health status.342 The wellness program exception, however, reintroduces risk rating back into the insurance pool, but only for certain disfavored conditions.343 Its danger lies in encouraging the
view that those conditions are personal faults that can be penalized. It can transform prejudices based on questionable data into
justifiable classifications based on health. One’s health status
may become a socially acceptable basis for discrimination.

341. Stanley J. Reiser, Responsibility for Personal Health: A Historical Perspective, 10 J.
MED. PHIL. 7 (1985) (noting that historical trends in U.S. favored personal responsibility
and self-sufficiency with limited government interference).
342. Mariner, supra note 40.
343. Mariner, supra note 12.

